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Post-War Developments in the 
Marketing of Butter 1 
By WILLIAM H. NICHOLLS* 
In spite of the many important changes which have taken place 
in the marketing of manufactured dairy products since the World 
War, no analysis which takes adequate account of these changes is yet 
available. While post-war text books on agricultural marketing have 
treated the marketing of manufactured dairy products in a very 
broad manner, their major emphasis has been on cooperation, with 
almost complete oversight of the marked and increasing importance 
of very large private business units in the distribution of the sev-
eral dairy products and the changes in marketing channels under 
way. It is the aim of this study to attempt partially to fill this gap 
by a reconsideration of the marketing of butter with special atten-
tion to changes in its channels of distribution, concentration in the 
butter industry, and the various supplementary and complementary 
relationships involved in the recent increased diversification of dairy 
products distributed. 
It has usually been assumed in the past that individual companies 
are of no consequence, only general tendencies or principles being 
of importance. With the recent development of the theory of im-
perfect competition, however, it has frequently seemed desirable to 
discuss individual companies, since it is recognized that each has 
more or less control, through consumers' preferences developed by 
branding and advertising, over a segment of the consuming popula-
tion, although this control may be relatively small if the possibilities 
of substitution are many. Butter, for example, is not a homogeneous 
commodity but is rather "Cloverbloom," "Brookfield," "Blue Val-
ley," "Land O'Lakes," etc.-a series of commodities which, because 
of the development of consumers' preferences for each, are not per-
fect substitutes even if of the same basic grade and quality. For 
this reason, the various business units will here be examined in their 
true light instead of merely as "butter manufacturers" or "central-
izers" or some other vague and uninteresting classification. 
Furthermore, all sources used herein are available to the gen-
eral public and are in no sense of a confidential nature. The ordin-
ary farmer, creamery operator, or layman, however, has not the 
time or inclination to go to such original sources in order to get a 
better and more accurate knowledge of the butter trade. Conserva-
tion of research resources, therefore, seems to justify the use of 
"For the guidance which led him originally to undertake research in this subject, 
the writer is deeply indebted to Dr. John D. Black of H arvard University. He grate-
fully acknowledges the helpful criticisms of the manuscript by his colleagues at Iowa 
State College, especially those by C. A. I verson, M. Mortensen , and A. W . Rudnick : 
A. D. Oderkirk, Frank Robotka, T. W. Schultz and Geoffrey Shepherd. 
1 Project 595 of the Iowa Agricultural Experiment Station. 
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company names, without which this particular type of analysis is 
much less real and intelligible. Finally, when companies assume 
the size of those discussed in this bulletin, they should acquire a 
certain responsibility of being willingly subject individually to 
public scrutiny. 
There is, of course, a danger that such an attitude will cause 
writings to deteriorate into mere company histories, such writings 
at the same time ignoring the broad principles or tendencies which 
are the goal of scientific writing. It is hoped that the present study 
is a proper combination of the two. 
BUTTER MARKETING AT THE END OF 
THE WAR: 1918-1920 
In 1918 the two chief marketing channels for butter were: 1. 
creamery-wholesale receiver-jobber-retailer-consumer, and 2. 
creamery (usually centralizer or packer) - exclusive sales agency-
retailer-consumer (65a). The former channel was already under-
going those alterations which were tending toward a shortening of 
the distributive process, for many wholesalers were also beginning to 
perform the jobbing function, bringing about one less middleman. 
As early as 1913 Frank G. Urner (69) had pointed out that "the 
lines of demarkation between wholesale receivers and jobbers have 
become indefinite and are tending toward obliteration in respect to 
all goods so graded and packed at primary points as to satisfy the 
demands of dealers nearer to the point of consumption." While 
Urner was discussing farm products in general, his words are none 
the less applicable to butter: "Jobbers, in the effort to obtain sup-
plies more cheaply, have reached out to primary sources of supply, 
over the head of wholesale receivers; and the latter, in order to 
maintain their hold upon supplies, have reached out over the heads 
of jobbers for outlets to retailers, so that the two classes of trade, 
formerly distinct, have tended toward a unification." Urner con-
tinued, pointing out that while all the various functions of distri-
bution clear through to the consumer might be combined under a 
central management, the wholesale receipt, classification (jobbing) 
and retail functions must remain as distinct departments of such 
enterprises. 
That the wholesaler-jobber was none too secure was also appar-
ent by 1913, for the chain store had already begun to challenge the 
wholesaler (18) as well as the independent retailer as its ever-
stronger policy of integration and direct purchase from the manu-
facturer got under way.2 
~s early as 1906 the New York Produce Review carried a full-page advertise-
ment (52-a) for the Great A . & P. Tea Co. which read: "We want your butter. With 
250 retail stores in the U. S. and having a very lara:e outlet for butter dire.ct to 
consumers, we respectfully solicit your shipments to tbis marJ<et ..... In 1910 a 
regular buyer was appointed by the A. & P. to buy "1500-2000 tubs of butter" on the 
New York market each week fOr a ll its eastern stores (52-b). 
Still earlier the Review corried an advert'sement (52-c) for butter by James Butler, 
"wholesale and retail grocer and commission merchant. 128 retail stores in greater 
New York." 
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Such giants-to-be as the Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. 
(founded in 1859) and the Kroger Grocer and Baking Co. (founded 
in 1883), however, were still "small for their age" with perhaps 500 
and 160 stores, respectively, in 1913. And by 1918 the sudden appear-
ance of adolescence had brought these chains and a number of other 
future goliaths into far greater prominence as increasingly rapid 
growth got under way. Between 1915 and 1924 the A. and P. chain 
increased from 650 to 9,303 stores and Kroger from 198 to 1,874 
stores, while a number of other chains grew with similar gusto. Be-
cause this Idevelopment did not begin on such a large scale until 
the War, and since it continued throughout most of the post-war pros-
perity, it seems proper, despite earlier recognition of its probable 
effects on distribution (18),3 to count the rise of chain stores to 
national significance as an important development of the post-war 
period (after 1918). This seems especially justified since at the end 
of the War the chain stores were still using wholesale receivers and 
centralizer sales agencies (the "regular" channels) far more than 
in later years (66-a). 
The thousands of small local (largely cooperative) creameries 
throughout the dairy states still used the wholesaler-jobber route. 
To be sure, a beginning toward federation of cooperatives had got 
under way, with a few hundred creameries selling through the Min-
nesota Cooperative Dairies Association,4 a joint stock organization 
(formed in 1907), which used regular butter dealers to market its 
product until 1915, when it set up its own distributing house in New 
York City, thereby .i oining the group of more integrated distribu-
tors. This organization. however, was not of much significance ex-
cept as a forerunner of bigger things to come along the lines of 
federation. for bv 1920 it was selling only 4.5 million {>ounds of 
butter (19-a). Similarly, Challenge Cream and Butter Association 
(established in 1910) in California, although it had by the end of 
the War indicated healthy growth, was sellin/! only 3.3 million pounds 
in 1918; by 1920 it was handling 4.5 million pounds (19-b). The 
development of large-scale regional cooperatives may, therefore, 
also be considered largely a post-war development, local creameries 
as a whole. both cooperative and proprietary, using the same lengthy 
channels of distribution in 1918. 
Aside from the relatively small amount of butter moving directly 
to the retailer or the consumer through the sales agencies of feder-
ated cooperatives or chain stores, the great bulk of the butter moving 
BE. g., Warber (74): "The distinctive characterisUc of the chain store system is 
the fact that the purchasing of all supplies is centralized; and thus 'the system' has 
the advantage[sl of having its supplies selected by expert judges of quality and re-
duced prices for large bulk purchases." In Philadelphia the chains were getting 
"extras at an average of 2 cents below the prevailing prices paid by other classes 
of retailers. " 
4Not to be confused with the predecessor of Land O'Lakes, the Minnesota Cooper-
aUve Creameries Association, established in 1921. 
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TABLE 1. PRINCIPAL BUTTER-MARKEl'ING COMPANIES, NUMBER OF 
POUNDS SOLD, AND PERCENT OF TOTAL CREAMERY BUTTER 
PRODUCED IN THE UNITED STATES, 1918.* 
Company Pounds Percent of U. (000) production 
Swift & Co. 66,621 8.2 
Beatt'ice Creamery Co. 61.335 7.5 
Armour & Co. 51,016 6.2 
Blue Valley Creamery Co. 26,484 3.2 
Wilson & Co. 21.565 2.6 
Hunter, Walton, & Co. 20,276 2.5 
Cudahy Packing Co. 16.760 2.1 
Total 264.~57 32.3 
Total U. S. creamery butter 818,175 100.0 
. -Fed. trade commission. Milk and Milk Products. 73. 1921. 
S. 
through the integrated route was that of the great centralizers and 
packers. The situation in 1918 is shown in table 1 as compiled by 
the federal trade commission (8). Of the seven companies listed as 
the nation's largest, four were meat packers, two centralizers and 
one a butter dealer (Hunter, Walton and Co.). All these companie~ 
used their own distribution facilities to some extent, at least, from 
the factory through to the retailer except Hunter, Walton and Co., 
which is more properly classified as a large wholesaler unit in the 
less direct route already discussed. 
In 1902 "Swift was just beginning to handle dairy and poultry 
products" (45-a) 5. By 1911 it had adopted its now-famous "Brook· 
field" brand and had first begun packing its butter in I-pound car-
tons. "By 1917 about half of its volume was sold in that way" 
(45-b). In 1918 Swift's method of assembling produce was "sub-
stantially different from that employed by the other packers. We 
rely largely on our own country plants, which collect, prepare, and 
ship these products; the other packers buy more heavily from other 
dealers" (46) 6. About one-half of the butter handled by Swift was 
purchased from other manufacturers in that year, however. In 1918 
Swift and Co. already had 33 creameries operating on the centralizel 
principle, chiefly in regions where dairying was only a sideline 
rather than the chief farm enterprise. 
Armour and Co. had been distributing produce during about the 
same period but purchased a relatively greater proportion of its 
butter and manufactured correspondingly less than Swift. In 1918 
Armour had 12 creameries. "Prior to 1914, the [produce] line did 
5However, in 1900 the Nelv York Produce Review (52-d) had already editorialized 
that "several of the big meat packing houses who have of late years undertaken the 
distribution of butter, eggs, and poultry, are able to forward these articles under a 
false classification at a much lower freight rate than charged to the smaller operators." 
The Review suggested that the trade bring it before the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission for correction. In 1900 Swift had 5 produce houses, the first two of which 
were established in 1897 (41-a). 
6Swift's claim here was that it handled only 5.9 percent of United States butter but 
it included farm butter in its calculation . 
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110t hold such an important place" in the Cudahy Packing Co.'s 
activities (39-a), but the War period brought rapid expansion for 
both Cudahy and the fourth member of the meat-packing "Big 
Four," Wilson and Co_ In 1918 Cudahy had three plants of its own, 
while Wilson reported none, apparently buying all the butter it dis-
tributed at that time (41-b)_ 
Not only butter but cheese, eggs and poultry were included in 
the packers' produce line, business in these commodities developing 
in order to take advantage of the economies in assembling from 
farmers, economies in manufacture and preparation for market, 
economies in distribution through the elaborate system of branch 
houses, refrigerator cars and car routes, and perhaps to deal in, if 
not to get control of, the leading substitutes for meat products and 
0leomargarine,7 as charged by the federal trade commission (41) in 
1919_ In spite of the commission's condemnation of the packer's 
produce activities, so rapidly expanded during the War, the Packers' 
Consent Decree of 1920, while forcing the packers to give up such 
" unrelated" lines as wholesale groceries and fresh or canned fish, 
left their operations in butter, cheese, eggs, poultry and oleomarga-
rine undisturbed, although the distribution of fresh milk and cream 
was specifically forbidden_ 
The Beatrice and Blue Valley companies, in contrast with the 
multifarious activities of the meat packers, were solely in the dairy-
products business. By 1900 Beatrice was advertising itself (52-e) as 
"the world's largest creamery," producing about 9 million pounds 
of butter a year. s By 1920 Beatrice had 16 creameries with 3 cold 
storage warehouses and distributing agencies throughout the East 
and South. The War saw rapid expansion of Beatrice's butter sales 
from 20 million pounds in 1913 to 63 million pounds in 1919 (49.a). 
The rise of this company from a beginning in 1891 was character-
ized by expansion, to a considerable degree, through acquisition of a 
number of other (for their day) very large creamery companies 
throughout the West Central states. 
The Blue Valley Creamery Co. also was operating close to 20 
creameries in 1920. The history of this company (5) had been 
one of constant effort to build up the sales to retailers of the Blue 
Valley package butter. So successful had this effort been that "for 
many years .. not a single pound of the company's butter [of the 
required grade] ... has ever been sold in any way but in the stand-
ard blue and yellow ... package ... The great bulk of these sales 
7From 1873 on. the manufacture of oleomargarine increased rapidly in the 
United States. largely because of the early activities of the meat packers in their 
utilization of the edible fat by.products from their meat operations. The Country 
Gentleman of 1900 carried stories of the suit of New York State vs. Armour and Co. 
for $500,000 for violation of the state's oleomargarine law. The state lost the suit 
because of its inability to obtain records from the railways as to the quantities of 
oleomargarine shipped in. 
sIn 1905 its output was 34 million pounds, 7 million of which was renovated. 
By this time the company had six large creameries and five sales agencies and dis. 
tributed direct to retailers in the East and South (52-f). 
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have been made from the company's own refrigerated automobile 
trucks direct to the retailers ... Some package butter is also sold 
to certain selected distributors in smaller cities where no company 
organization is maintained." Blue Valley was unique among the 
very large centralizing creameries in its method of procuring cream 
from its producers. While Beatrice and most other centralizers had 
always used cream-assembly points in many villages and towns 
throughout the Midwest, which in turn forwarded the cream to the 
factories, Blue Valley did not operate a single cream station. Each 
farmer shipped his cream direct to Blue Valley, and the company 
dealt directly with each farmer. Such a method of assembly was 
remarkable for a company so large. 
The year 1918 was the first that total butter produced in United 
States creameries exceeded the total produced on farms. In 1917 only 
45.6 percent of the nation's butter was produced in creameries. In 
1918 this figure was 53.4 percent. 9 In the post-war period farm butter 
was to fall rapidly from its once dominant position and packaged 
butter similarly to attain increasing importance relative to tub but-
ter, which is sold to the consumer in bulk. In 1917, however, al-
though the individual package was commonly used, "in New York 
City, Boston, Buffalo, Cleveland, Charleston and New Orleans, the 
practice of retailing butter from tubs [was] still quite prevalent" 
(66-b). The United States Department of Agriculture in 1918 first 
undertook quality standardization by establishing a uniform basis 
for grading butter. At that time, standards were used in all of the 
important receiving markets but were variously interpreted both 
within a given market and between markets. The Department 
adopted standards which followed closely the established trade prac-
tice but made them more definite and applied them more or less 
uniformly in all markets through Government graders (58). It 
should be noted, however, that federal grading was instituted only 
in the central markets at that time. The trend toward grading at 
point of production had not yet begun. 
In 1914 the Elgin Board of Trade, so long an important basis 
for butter prices, was at last "enjoined from publishing its price as 
official, and in November, 1917, they discontinued their meetings ... " 
This Board was "to all intents and purposes a Chicago trading organ-
ization. A few traders from this city [Chicago] have been in the 
habit of going out to Elgin each Saturday for a short session at 
which they went through the form of a 'call.' The amount thus sold 
has averaged only about 50 tubs per week . . . " (64-a).1 0 In spite 
of the shortcomings of this call-board as a legitimate place for reg-
istering the true value of butter, it is surprising to note that at the 
9Appendix Table I. (76). However, in the leading butter-producing states, this shift 
had taken place several decades earlier. 
lONourse (64-b) later remarked: ..... the only reason that Chicago dealers 
should keep up the absurd practice of going out there each Saturday to go through 
the forms of a 'call' would seem to be because it gives them Borne control over prices." 
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time it was forced to cease operations, 80 percent of Wisconsin 
creameries were using Elgin as a basis of price, as compared with 
16 percent using Chicago and 4 percent New York (65-b).11 This 
is an interesting example of how long once-important economic 
institutions may continue to survive after they have outlived their 
(legitimate) usefulness. The continuation of the Plymouth cheese 
exchanges to the present time seems a parallel case, although the 
alternative price mechanism is 'less evident than that at the time of 
the Elgin demise. 
SUMMARY 
The marketing picture of 1918-20 should probably be summar-
ized at this point. The most important marketing channel included 
a wholesaler and a jobber, but economic forces were already at work 
tending to obliterate the lines between these two marketing agencies. 
Large chain-store organizations were just beginning to assume a 
position of real significance, and since they had not yet reached a 
size which made the development of their own integrated agencies 
from the creamery to the consumer economically feasible, they still 
depended largely on the terminal-market wholesalers and centralizer 
sales agencies for their supplies. Cooperation was still chiefly con-
fined to small local creameries, and, although there were a few 
"straws in the wind," large-scale federated sales agencies were ' not 
yet of great importance. 
The second most important marketing channel was a manufac-
turer-direct-to-retailer movement, which had already been used for 
some time by the four leading meat-packers and two large central-
izer organizations, which taken together marketed just under 30 per-
cent of the nation's butter. The Packers' Consent Decree of 1920 
failed to forbid the meat-packers' continued participation in the 
produce line, and their elaborate distributive facilities were well-
prepared to assure them of continued importance in the marketing 
of butter. 
The volume of farm-made butter, for the country as a whole, had 
just fallen behind the volume of creamery butter for the first time, 
although the transition had taken place a number of years before in 
the most important dairy states. Butter still reached the consumer, 
to an important extent, unpackaged, while federal grading was only 
iust being established in the central markets. And finally, the Elgin 
Board of Trade-so long used as a basis of settlement for butter 
shipments-having outlived its legitimate usefulness, was given a 
none-too-Iamented burial. 
DEVELOPMENTS OF 1921-1927 
The immediate post-war period saw a steadily increasing em-
phasis on high quality butter. The 1926 Dairy Produce Yearbook 
(75), in reviewing that year, had this to say (italics mine): " . 
llThis quotation was also used throughout Illinois, Iowa, Indiana and Ohio. 
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perhaps the outstanding development [of 11)26] is to be found ill 
the matter of butter quality ... Cooperative creameries . .. have 
been forcing this issue with apparent success. With greater supplies 
of butter scoring in the nineties, the consumer is loath to accept a 
return to lower qualities when supplies of fancy run short." Not 
only was the consumer becoming more discri'minating about the 
quality of butter which he used-in the face of increasing emphasis 
on quality on the part of the trade- but his general economic con· 
dition was such as to make his demand for the higher quality butter 
(at a higher price) "effective." The spread between 92 and 90·score 
butter was reported to be greater than ever before, and Land O'Lakes 
raised the percentage of its butter scoring 93 or better from 32.4 to 
61.0 percent in that year (29). From its establishment, Land O'Lakes 
based its whole merchandising campaign on "quality appeal." Less 
conspicuous than the large federated cooperatives but highly sig-
nificant in the development of high quality butter during this period 
was the long-time program of quality improvement being carried 
on by the state colleges in several of the leading butter-producing 
states.12 
As early as 1924, when Land O'Lakes Creameries, just getting 
under way, was selling 33 million pounds of butter,13 most of which 
reached the retailer chiefly in tubs rather than in prints, the cooper-
ative started its branding policy, in spite of the objections of its 
wholesale distributors, who were accustomed to erasing the manu-
facturer's mark and substituting their own (52-g). Furthermore, 
Land O'Lakes' merchandising program from the beginning devoted 
much of its advertising space to indicate the "Hidden Losses" (52-h), 
due to' loss of time, very small sales and waste, in the sale of bulk-
as compared with packaged- butter, and sought to hasten the shift to 
butter sold in a form which is readily identifiable by the final con-
sumer, and hence more susceptible to the development of the con-
sumer's preference for the "Land O'Lakes" name. Year by year. 
under such a campaign, Land O'Lakes increased the proportion of 
its product sold in prints. Similarly, Swift was selling two-thirds of 
its butter in packages in 1926, as compared with only one-half in 
1917 (45-c). As late as 1930, however, it was esti'mated by the 
trade association of centralized butter manufacturers (l) 14 that 
~n Iowa, e. g., the Department of Dairy Industry of the state college has for 
many years conducted a Quality-improvement program through its own extension 
workers and a self-supporting quality-control laboratory. This program was no doubt 
an important factor in Iowa's success in winning banners for the highest Quality 
butter submitted in the annual competition held hy the National Butter Makers' Asso-
ciation, an honor won by Iowa hutter in 5 out of 8 years 1921-28 and in 1934. 
13For the sources of all data presented in this study concerning number of 
eoreameries, number of producE" houses. number of stores and volume of butter sold, 
the reader is referred to appendix tables III-VI, which present these data by years 
for centralizers, chain stores. cooperatives and meat-packers. respectively. with th~ 
source indicated for each figure. Frequent reference to these tables may also enable 
the reader to follow better from section to section the thread of continuity concern-
ing each type of marketing business unit. 
14American Ass'n. of Creamery Butter Manufacturers. The Association took 
this occasion to criticize Land O'Lakes for casting refledions on tub butter. 
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"500 million pounds of butter are marketed per annum to the COli · 
sumer ... [from tubs] ... in the eastern heavy-consuming states," 
not quite a third of all creamery butter produced that year. 
By 1926 Land O'Lakes butter sales were practically doubled at 
almost 80 million pounds. Savings to member-producers were ef-
fected not only by stressing high quality and developing a con-
sumer's preference therefor, but also by shipping in large quantities 
directly to developed market outlets. Whereas, before Land O'Lakes 
was formed, 80 percent of its members' butter had gone to New 
York and Philadelphia, in 1926 onl y 26 percent went to these cities 
(22), with savings on cross-hauling and reshipment and without the 
depressing effect on prices which had resulted at times, at least, from 
excessive receipts due to uncoordinated shipments. The chief outlets 
for the cooperative in 1926 were chain stores, .jobbers, milk com-
panies and ice cream manufacturers. It was supplying 25 large 
chains operating 20,000 stores at that time (19-c) and was in con-
tact with one or more jobbers in each of the large cities. The ice 
cream companies' demand for (unsalted) butter was for use in ice 
cream in times of seasonal cream shortage. 
Another rapidly growing cooperative was Challenge on the west 
coast. It was marketing nearly 26 million pounds of butter for its 
members in 1926 (24-a ), an amount almost nine times as great as 
in 1918. 
Closely allied with Land O'Lakes' drive for improved quality 
was its extensive use of federal grading at central country points 
after which certificates were made available for each I-pound carton 
of butter certifying that the butter was 93-score or better. This prac-
tice, with the government's prestige exploited to the limit in the 
cooperative's advertisements, brought sharp criticism from the trade 
association of centralized butter manufacturers, who contended that 
butter scoring 93 in the country might (and had, according to 
"accurate" tests) score below 90 at the time of the consumer's pur-
chase. 15 In spite of the furore aroused by this practice because it 
appeared the federal government was definitely "playing favorites," 
the offering by the Department of Agriculture of the same arrange-
ment on a cooperative basis to private companies as well as produc-
ers' cooperatives brought such a marked response from the private 
concerns 16 that a trend toward grading at or near the point of pro-
duction instead of at the central market may be named as one of 
the important post-war developments. 17 
- -I-SSee article in N. Y. Produce Review (52-i) by Dr. G. L. McKay, Secy .• 
American Association of Butter Manufacturers, also editorial on his article. The 
Review agreed with him but did say that credit was due Land O'Lakes for "improv-
ing the quality of its product and its keeping quality." The Association also was 
strong in its attack on the exploitation of federal prestige by Land O'Lakes, in one 
of whose advertisements even the Secretary of Agriculture of the United States was 
shown in plainly-labeled Land O'Lakes cap and apron. 
16E. g., Armour and Co. at Mankato, Minnesota and National Dairy Products at 
Dubuque, Iowa. 
17W. Bruce Silcox, Extension Economist. B. A. E., interview. 
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It is a general principle of marketing that the more perfectly 
goods are graded and standardized at the point of production, the 
more readily, and probably economically, they can be traded in 
"directly." Grading and standardization had been important func-
tions performed by the wholesalers and jobbers in the past. But, as 
grading and standardization became integrated with production, but-
ter dealers became obsolete insofar as these particular services were 
concerned, although either they, or a substitute in a more integrated 
channel, still had important selective services to perform in order to 
get each lot of butter to those consumers preferring the grade and 
quality which that particular lot possessed. 
Meanwhile, the chain stores were becoming an ever more im-
portant factor. A review of the New York butter trade (63) of 
1925-26 pointed out (italics mine) that" ... [demand] would have 
been better if the smaller grocers had not insisted on so great a 
margin between the wholesale and retail prices ... An unusual per-
centage of the trade went to the big chain stores all of which sold 
finer qzwlity than ever before at only a fair profit over cost ... " 
Another source (52-j) observed that "Each year the outlets for sec-
ond grade butter become more restricted .. _ only a few years ago 
... some of the big chain stores used cars of 89 to 90 score central· 
ized as their standard grade of tub butter ... [now] nearly all of 
them are calling for the 91 to 92 score goods [or even better]." 
While the Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. had been selling 
35 million pounds of butter annually in 1920 (14), its sales ex-
ceeded 100 million pounds in 1926 (52-k) by which time it embraced 
over 14,000 retail units as its period of rapid expansion neared a 
close. (In 1928 a peak of 15,671 stores was reached after which 
the number of stores began to decline.) The A. and P. now had a 
well-organized buying department, with a western soliciting force, 
a man to promote improved quality, and inspectors and buyers on 
the most important central markets (52·1). It invited shippers of 
fancy butter to take advantage of its direct outlet to so many stores 
("the Biggest Buyers in the World of Fancy Creamery Butter"), and 
its "rapid and efficient distribution, as our warehouses, located in all 
leading cities, have private railroad sidings and ample refrigerator 
facilities." 
The American Stores Co. with about 1,800 stores, was soliciting 
(52-m) shipments from creameries which were willing to raise the 
quality of their butter-with the help of the company's field man-
to 92 or 93 score. Other large and growing chain stores in 1926 
were Kroger with about 2,900 stores, Piggly Wiggly with 2,000 stores, 
First National Stores with 1,650, and others, all offering a rapidly 
increasing market for direct shipments of butter without its passing 
through the hands of any wholesale agency before reaching the in-
tegrated channels of the company which was to sell it finally to the 
consumer. 
333 
In the 8 years following the War, Swift and Company had prac-
tically doubled its number of produce plants, with 55 in 1926, but 
its number of creameries had increased only slightly from 38 to 41 
(49-b).18 It was expanding rapidly, however, in distribution in the 
whole produce field, as were the other large packers. Armour and 
Company, meanwhile, was notifying the trade (52-n, italics mine) 
that" ... only [about] 50 percent of the produce distributed to 
[our] 500 or more branch houses represent goods that are 'Armour' 
packed and branded. Armour and Co. are in the business every day 
locating and buying the other 50 percent needed to keep a natwn-
wide selling organization actively engaged." In 1927 Armour had 
27 creameries, over twice as many as in 1918, and almost a 70 per-
cent increase over 1925 (53-a).1 9 
Similarly, Fairmont Creamery Co., with 16 centralizing manu-
facturing plants and distributing 56 million pounds of butter 
(1926), was soliciting butter for sale or consignment apart from 
butter manufactured in its own plants in order to maintain a profit-
able volume for continued operation of its distributive facilitie3. 
Beatrice Creamery Co., with total sales of 75 million pounds (a 23 
percent gain over 1918) in 1925 likewise purchased practically half 
(49.6 percent) of its butter (49-b). Blue Valley Creamery Co. had 
grown rapidly to a volume of 40 million pounds or more, a gain 
of over 50 percent in volume in the 8 years since 1918, and had 22 
creamenes. 
The continued expansion of the packers and centralizers was of 
great importance because they distributed their product directly to 
retailers, making it desirable to use more fully their costly distrib-
uting resources. To do so they made large-scale purchases of other 
butter for distribution along with that manufactured in their own 
plants, bringing increasing pressure on the old-line wholesalers as 
still greater volume was diverted to more integrated and direct chan-
nels. 
Wholesalers in the large central markets were affected not only 
by loss of business to other distributing agencies within their reo 
spective cities but also by "loss of part of [their] out-aI-town trade 
which [had] fallen away with the development of more direct dis-
tribution between producing areas and the smaller eastern cities 
(70)." Rapidly increasing local needs, however, were instrumental 
in largely offsetting this loss in such centers as New York City. 
Under the force of competition the tendency was therefore con-
stantly toward more direct distribution both geographically and 
physically as qualities were improved and standardized and as the 
18From this period on, the writer found it necessary to lean heavily on the 
number of packers' "produce plants" a8 an index of changes taking place in their 
number of "creameries," because the latter was often not available. A very impOrtant 
prolJortion of the packers' "produce plants" handle on ly poultry and eggs, so that it Is 
a very rough measure, at best. for our present purpose. 
19Armour had thus increased the proportion of butter manufactured in its own 
plants considerably over 1918. 
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necessity of re-inspection and re-selection was reduced. The constant 
effort of the wholesaler-jobbers was to meet the prevailing and 
growing chain store competition by as direct and economical a move-
ment as possible to the retail store. "Thus the tendency of the chain 
store to buy direct from primary points, grade its purchases if neces-
sary and then move the graded product directly to its retail stores, 
is met by a similar direct distribution on the part of the dealer ... , 
who must depend on his judgment of qualities, his ability to grade 
to meet the needs of his retail customers and an economical handling 
to meet the economies of the chain store. For, after all, the chain 
store ... must still, if it is to please its trade, perform the [same] 
selective services ... the jobber [does]. It gains an economy in 
large business volume, but it sacrifices that great chance of economy 
through intimate contact which the jobber can realize in directing 
the affairs of his own enterprise" (70-a). 
It is probable, however, that, on the whole, those organizations 
which participated in the marked trend toward more direct market-
ing after the War were content to appeal to and meet the needs of 
that majority of the consuming population which is not inclined by 
reason of natural bent or economic conditions to be unusually dis-
criminating in its preferences for the butter it buys, and hence such 
organizations did not "perform the [same] selective services ... 
the jobber [does]." While all the direct-marketing organizations 
shared somewhat in the trend toward improved quality in the post-
war period, no doubt increasing consumer consciousness of differ-
ences in the quality of butter thereby, the chain stores, packers and 
centralizers all probably found their outlets chiefly among those 
. conforming to a less discriminating "average taste."20 The chain 
stores tended to offer a relatively good quality of butter, but its sale 
was largely based on price-appeal and a low margin. The packers 
and centralizers endeavored to offset the somewhat inferior quality 
(generally true but not without exception) of their product by con-
siderable expenditures in the development of brand-preference 
through advertising and other sales promotion. Of those marketing 
direct, only the large cooperative organizations combined the finest 
quality with an effort to develop consumers' preferences for a 
branded product to such an extent that a retail premium would be 
willingly paid in order to obtain the best quality available. 
Because of the more limited number of quite discriminating con-
sumers, to whom the large cooperatives of necessity had to appeal on 
grounds of quality, the wisdom of attempting to integrate the selling 
or outlet-finding function with production and standardization is 
more to be questioned than in the case of those private organizations 
which produced a product of more nearly average quality and which, 
~n analogous case is that of those large retail chains which sell shoes, largely 
on a price basis. Only shoes which can be worn by the more or less Uaverage" foot 
are carried. uncommon widths and lengths not being manufactured or stocked at all . 
A person with an unusual foot has no choice but to go to a store which specializes 
in fitting such feet and must pay for the extra selective service involved. 
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all factors considered, appealed to a wider and less discriminating 
market. Since consumer demand is a composite of a multitude of 
tastes and preferences which a specialized agency, such as a jobber, 
is probably in the best position to sense, he will always find a place 
in the market picture in serving that considerable body of consumers 
which has the most discriminating, fastidious, or even "peculiar" 
preferences, perhaps even for certain attributes completely apart 
from actual grade or quality.21 He will also have to continue to 
perform such standardization as is not performed nearer the source 
of production. 
In 1925 the leading trade journal noted that "the wholesale and 
jobbing business ... is highly competitive and composed of some 
large but many small business units. The trend of the times toward 
business consolidation has not yet made much progress here, an 
indication of the economy with which the individual units are now 
being operated" (70). In less than a year later, however, the same 
journal was taking a markedly more pessimistic tone as to the 
wholesalers' position in the marketing picture (52-0): " ... [under] 
the method of receiving goods on a contract or guarantee basis ... 
[the price] has been forced too high in relation to selling values 
by the stress of competition. The cause of an undue competition is 
probably the fact that in relation to the total product, the need for 
wholesale distribution through the old line houses is decreasing and 
has already been much lessened." Chain stores, packers and cooper-
ative marketing organizations were named as the chief factors in 
diminishing the wholesalers' volume of business, leaving "chiefly 
the unstandardized goods" for general distribution through the old-
line wholesalers "at little or no profit." 
The usual method of trading here referred to between the prim-
ary shipper and the wholesale receiver is by verbal contract; the 
price to be paid for the shipment is based by mutual agreement on 
some selected quotation. The quotation selected and the relation 
to that quotation presumably varies with the quality of the goods 
and the reputation of the brand under which they were packed. 
Competition and the peculiar appeal of receiving a "premium over 
the market," however, had made such a premium universal, so that 
it was obviously necessary for the receiver paying such a premium 
also to sell his butter at a premium if he was to show a profit. Thus 
we have the perplexing problem of quotations purporting to repre-
sent prices received by wholesalers in sales to jobbers, while the 
prices previously paid by the wholesalers for the same goods are 
these quotations plus a premium. While many think of this as a 
new problem (the post-war editorial pages of the New York Pro-
duce Review carried this subject far more frequently than any other), 
21 For example, the Jewish consumer of the eastern cities is extraordinarily 
discriminating in his demands lor a butter to suit his taste. Not only must it be 
unsalted. as a rule, but it must not possess a degree 01 rancidity such as would be 
impercevtible to the Uaverage" consumer. 
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the Review's second issue, in 1896 (52-p), carried an editorial in 
which it pointed out that "an abuse of competition" had led most 
of the New York butter houses to buy on a basis of guaranteeing 
t cent above the Urner-Barry quotation and called for efforts to 
eliminate this cut-throat practice. The Review's publisher, the 
Urner-Barry Coo, was prompted to take this stand because of charges 
that it was making quotations which were depressed enough below 
the actual ruling price to make such premiums possible. 
The 1926 editorial (52-0) continued: "Naturally, the result of 
this condition has been a tendency toward reduction in the number 
of wholesale receivers"- either through combination or going out 
9f business. The suggested sol ution was a reasonable service profit 
on that considerable part of receipts which would not be adapted to 
direct distribution for many years to come. In a later issue the Re-
view (52-q) expressed its belief that the unprofitability of the whole-
sale trade was "the result of an undue competition to hold in the 
general wholesale market standardized goods which are fit for more 
direct outlets." 2 2 
That these were not idle words is shown by a survey of the trade 
journals of this period. Such a survey reveals that the mid-'20'" 
were marked by reports of failures of a considerable number of 
(often well-known) wholesale houses and of consolidations of other 
long-established, substantial firms.2 3 
SUMMARY 
Almost all of the major developments of the post-war period 
in butter marketing became evident during the years 1921-27. The 
marked trend toward a higher-quality product gained an ever-
stronger foothold during the post-war years, especially because of 
the combined efforts of the newly-formed cooperative sales agencies, 
the rapidly developing chain store organizations, and the dairy ex-
tension workers of the state colleges, although the packers and 
centralizers also shared somewhat in the advance. 
The two leading cooperative marketing organizations, Land 
O'Lakes and Challenge, quickly rose to a position of importance 
during this period, their whole campaign centered on "quality ap-
peal." Land O'Lakes, in its desire to develop a pronounced con-
sumer preference for its products, soon was packaging butter under 
its own brand and for that reason sought to hasten the trend away 
from bulk butter, which was sold to the final consumer · from tubs. 
Important savings on freight, cross-shipments and the prevention 
of "dumping" butter on the central markets were made. In conjunc-
tion with Land O'Lakes' drive for quality was the first cooperative 
arrangement with the United States Department of Agriculture pro-
22An unusually sound and frank statement for a trade journal to make. 
23E. g., the consolidation of the two famous old houses of D. W. Whitmore 
and Co. (est . .1869) and Charles P. McCabe (est. 1859) in 1927 (52-r). This house 
was purchased by National Dairy Products CorpOration through Kraft-Phenix (sub-
sidiary) in 1931. 
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vi ding for grading at central country points. When this privilege was 
made available to private companies as well, a trend toward federal 
grading at or near the point of production instead of on the central 
markets was under way. This movement at the same time tended to 
eliminate the need for what had once been an important function of 
the wholesaler- that of grading and standardization-and thereby 
favored more direct marketing. 
The chain stores were now growing very rapidly, and as their 
demands for butter increased apace, they turned to the establish-
ment of their own integrated distributive facilities to which they 
solicited the shipment of high quality butter direct from country 
creameries. While the leading packers and centralizers were increas-
ing their number of plants rapidly, not only were they manufactur-
ing ever greater quantities of butter, but they were also buying in-
creasing quantities from other manufacturers in order to make the 
most economical use of their nation-wide selling organizations. 
The rapidly increasing importance of these various types of large 
scale, direct-distributing agencies was instrumental in bringing very 
great pressure to bear on the old-line wholesalers, especially from 
1926 on, as increasing amounts of butter were diverted from the 
more lengthy channel, which included the wholesalers and jobbers, 
to the more direct, integrated route. The result was a definite tend-
ency toward a reduction in the number of wholesalers, either through 
combination with other wholesalers and with jobbers or through 
business failure. 
MERGER AND DIVERSIFICATION: 1928-1930 
By early 1930 Beatrice Creamery Co. had 36 creamery plants, 
nearly double the number in 1920 (9-a). Before the end of the year 
its number of creameries reached 40 or more. Beatrice sold in that 
year about 97 million pounds of butter (slightly more than in 1929 
and a gain of 30 percent over 1925) of which around 70 percent 
was produced in the company's own plants, the remainder purchased 
from other manufacturers. The company was producing a consid-
erably larger proportion in its own plants, however. than in 1926. 
More important to note, Beatrice was now culminating a period of 
very rapid expansion by acquisition of other companies and had 
embarked on a diversified program of dairy and poultry products 
according to the example being set by the two modern giants of the 
dairy products field, National Dairy Products Corporation, which 
almost acquired Beatrice in 1927 (3), and the Borden Company. 
Table 2 shows the amounts of the various products being handled 
by Beatrice in the years of the period of rapid expansion, 1928-30 
(49-c).24 Between July, 1929, and November, 1931. Beatrice ac-
-"80 much space is devoted in this study to Beatrice for three important reasons. 
First (necessarily of importance to the researcher), an unusually large volume of 
data was available concerning it. Second, among the three largest dairy oorporations, 
Beatrice (ranking third) was the only one which, before diversifying, originally made 
its name as a manufacturer of butter (our present interest) rather than of some 
other dairy product. Finally, it serves as an excellent example of the importance 
and eoonomies of diversification in the manufacture and distribution of dairy products. 
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TABLE 2: VOLUME OF SALES BY KIND OF PRODUCT FOR BEATRICE 
CREAlvIERY CO .• 1927-1930 (in units of a thousand). 
Sales 1927 1928' I 1929 I 1930 
----
Value of sales (dollars) $39.981 $53.306 $83.682 $82.811 
Butter sold (lbs.) 58.530 65.194 96.837 97.273 
Butter produced (lbs.) 44.770 60.832 66.063 70.206 
Butter purchased (lbs. ) 13.760 15.362 29.774 27.067 
Ice cream mfgd. (gals.) 984 3.409 5.~~7 9.360 
Eggs (doz.) 12.448 16.715 57.119 67.848 
Milk (gals.) 1.996 12.101 21.023 29.761 
Cheese (lbs.) 2.626 2.765 3.206 3.347 
Poultry (lbs.) 1.838 1.863 9.171 14.750 
'Excluding Fox River Butter Co .• sold June 1. 1928. Because this subsidiary is 
eliminated in this table for 1927 and 1928. the butter figures as here given are some-
what too low in these 2 years for comparison with butter volume in 1925 (as given 
supra. p. 333). which included this subsidiary. 
quired 94 separate and distinct companies in 17 states, most heavily 
concentrated in Illinois, Iowa, Missouri and Ohio but including Col-
orado, Maryland, Montana, New York, Oklahoma and Pennsylvania 
as well. Table 3 shows when these acquisitions were made and the 
total number of operating units for the various products at each 
date. By the last part of 1930, besides 41 creamery units, Beatrice 
had 83 ice cream units, 50 fluid milk units, 9 cold storage plants and 
4 ice plants. 
In 1929 a letter to stockholders (4) explained that the substan-
tial increase in volume and sales of creamery butter in 1928 over 
1927 was due chiefly to an increase in business from properties 
previously owned and not from acquisitions. However, in line with 
its policy of "expansion in the ice cream department ... the volume 
for 1928 is almost ten times in excess of the volume four years ago," 
the result of a number of acquisitions. Ice cream offered an un-
usually good margin, a chance to market more butterfat at home 
and helped to absorb part of the cost of refrigeratiolJ. already re-
quired for butter (6). In fluid milk, "following the company's 
policy of diversification," it was "gradually adding milk plants 
[because] milk plants fit in very satisfactorily with [its] business 
... and ... [because its] policy of diversifying ... [was expected 
to] add greatly to the stability and earning power of [the] Com-
pany." Finally, Beatrice was operating "the only transcontinental 
cold storage system in the United States ... [with warehouses] in 
Los Angeles, Denver, Topeka, ... Chicago, ... Scranton and New 
Haven," and this department was said to be profitable, with prom-
ise of further expansion, since the cost of refrigeration could be 
lowered if fuel or power was bought in larger quantities on a 24-
hour-a-day schedule and part of the storage space sold to others. 
From this it may be seen that Beatrice's continued and accelerated 
expansion in 1929 and 1930 was in line with a planned policy of 
diversification in order to obtain greater stability and earning pow-
er. Fairmont Creamery Co. also' diversified but on a far less exten-
sive scale. This trend toward diversification of product and terri-
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TABLE 3. ACQUISITIONS BY BEATRICE CREAMERY COMPANY 1929-31 AND 
TOTAL NUMBER OF OP;ERATING UNITS FOR THE 
VARIOUS PRODUCTS AT EACH DATE (9-b). 
Date of Total number of units· at given date Number of stock Ice Cold acquisitions listing Creameries Cream Milk Storage Ice 
1929 
~ 34 July 7 23 49 17 6 3 56 15 Aug. 20 26 49 30 8 3 7 Nov. 1 31 57 37 8 3 
1930 { 10 April 3 36 66 38 8 3 37 18 July 8 40 77 45 8 4 6 Aug. 20 41 82 48 8 4 
3 Nov. 14 41 83 50 8 4 
1931 
1 1 Nov. 6 41 83 50 9 4 
-
94 
*"Un:t" rather than "plant" because several such units may be in the same plant. 
torial expansion25 in the dairy products industry was very marked 
in the post-war period, accompanying the greatly accelerated growth 
of large dairy corporations. Although space will not permit further 
elaboration on this important development, it should be mentioned 
that the Borden Company, originally selling only condensed milk 
in New York, had by now expanded (with 207 acquisitions between 
1928 and 1932) until it was nation-wide and manufactured and sold 
every conceivable dairy product; that the chief product of National 
Dairy Products Corporation, originating as a holding company in 
1923, was at first ice cream, but by 1932 it had acquired 317 com-
panies and was manufacturing and selling all dairy products (34) ; 
that the Carnation Company, whose early name was made as a 
manufacturer of evaporated milk, is now a leading distributor of fluid 
milk in the four leading Pacific Coast cities and in Texas, Oklahoma 
and Arkansas; and that the Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corporation which, 
before National Dairies acquired it in order to make a strong bid 
in the cheese line, had itself already undergone considerable diversi-
fication, especially through its subsidiary, Southern Dairies (with 
ice cream and fluid milk plants throughout the South), and other 
acquisitions manufacturing butter and concentrated milk. 26 Thus 
we see that the large dairy corporations, regardless of original em-
phasis on any single dairy product, have spread out to manufacture 
and distribute all such products. So far as butter is concerned, 
National Dairy Products Corporation, the largest in the dairy prod-
ucts field, sold 98.4 million pounds in 1930 (49-d), compared with 
40.5 million pounds in 1928 and 21.9 million pounds in 1926. No 
figures are available on the amount of butter handled by Bordens, 
25Greater stability is claimed because all telTitories are not affected equally 
severely by adverse conditions-either of business or of production- and profit mar-
gins on goods vary (e. g. high margins prevalent on ice cream) (3I-a). It is not 
meant to imply here that promotional and monopolistic (non-efficiency) motives were not 
paramount in the mushroom growth of these dairy corporations. Such motives. how-
ever, were much more likely in the other important dairy products than in butter. 
'6And of high importance, although not a dairy product, mayonnaise. 
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the second largest dairy corporation, but it is believed to have been 
considerably less. 
Armour and Company had 59 produce plants in 1930 (44), but 
its number of creameries showed no further gain so that its purchase 
of butter from other sources was still of major importance. It was 
also the leading distributor of bulk (unprocessed) cheese and had 
two large condenseries in Wisconsin. Swift and Company was ap-
parently selling 118.6 million pounds of butter in 1929 from 76 
creameries, a gain of 85 percent in number compared with 1926 
(appendix table VI). It had 20 produce houses in Iowa alone. Swift 
was an important distributor of cheese, operating through two con-
trolled subsidiaries in Wisconsin. Finally, it had about 10 ice cream 
units (53-b). Cudahy had 11 produce plants for butter (39-b) and 
bought cheese through a subsidiary company for distribution with its 
other products. Wilson had about the same number of produce plants. 
Thus it may be seen that dairy products were assuminl?; still greater 
importance in the business of the great meat packers. Although 
figures are not available as to the volume of butter sales of the 
several packers, Fortune (3-a ) reported that Swift and Armour 
passed Beatrice in this regard during the '20's, which would prob-
ably place both meat packers' respective sales at that time beyond 
the hundred million mark as undisputed leaders in the butter in-
dustry.27 
In 1930 the A. and P. chain had 15,418 stores, slightly less than 
in 1928 but 10 percent more than in 1926. Its butter sales were 
approaching 200 million pounds. 28 A very small part of its sales 
(about 800,000 pounds) was now being manufactured on an experi-
mental basis in its own creamery, built in Iowa in 1929, and it now 
owned three cheese factories and a subsidiary company which was 
one of the country's largest manufacturers of evaporated milk. Kro-
ger, with 5,575 stores in 1930 (a 50 percent gain over 1926), had 
five pasteurizing and bottling plants, having been "a pioneer in the 
sale of fluid milk in grocery stores" (16). 
American Stores, with 2,644 stores, was operating "a large milk 
evaporation plant, the entire production of which [was] taken over 
by the parent company and sold through its chain of retail stores" 
(17). Safeway Stores, Inc., a holding company formed in 1928 for 
two chains with 840 stores, had expanded by a number of acquisi-
tions of other important chains, to 2,675 stores in 1930, at which 
time it also owned two California creameries. Finally First National 
Stores, with 2,549 stores in the Northeast, having found direct associa-
tion with a cooperative organization of fluid milk producers satisfac· 
tory in the Boston area, saw fit to purchase outright or a controlling 
27In 1931 Swift and Co. claimed that "[Swiftl handles more meat and produce 
than any other concern" and in 1932, that their Brookfield butter was the "largest 
selling brand in the world." (45-c, 45-d). 
2BIn 1932 it actually passed this figure, with 20'4 million pounds (50-a). Of 
this butter Iowa furnished 20.7 percent, Minnesota 18.5, Wisconsin 11.4, Indiana 9.7. 
North Dakota 5.7, all others, 34.0. 
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interest "in companies located in Minnesota and Dakota, operating 
five plants and over 300 country buying stations [for] ... butter, 
poultry ... and eggs" (13). The company gave as its reasons the 
need for an ample supply in the short season, uniformity of type 
and quality, and a better chance to adapt product to New England 
consumers' demands. From these facts it may be seen that there was 
some tendency, though not nearly as strong in butter as in evaporated 
milk, for chain store organizations to reach back to the manufactur· 
ing stage for at least a part of their final volume of sales of dairy 
products. 
In 1930 Land O'Lakes Creameries, with a membership of about 
470 cooperative associations, for the first time handled over one 
hundred (101) million pounds of butter, of which 35 percent was 
sold, largely in eastern markets, under their well-known brand name, 
"Land O'Lakes" (24-b, 50-b). They had extended their direct mer-
chandising program until almost all 2 9 of their products were sold 
direct to retail outlets. In 1930 they set up 15 sales branch houses 
in the East and Midwest through which their butter and other prod-
ucts could be sold and delivered direct to their retail customers. This 
was the final step in their program of integration from the farm to 
the retailer. 3o 
Challenge of California was now (1930) producing 33.9 million 
pounds of butter, a gain of more than 30 percent over 1926, almost 
all of it marketed direct to retailers. In 1928, dissatisfied with 
eastern 'brokers' sales of their dry skimmilk and eastern wholesalers' 
sales of their surplus butter, they arranged a working agreement with 
Land O'Lakes under which all butter and dry skimmilk sent east of 
the Rockies would be sent to Land O'Lakes to be marketed by that 
agency under its own brand, while Land O'Lakes products moving 
to California, if any, would be sold by the Challen,'Se sales fo rce under 
the "Challenge" brand. In this way, Challenge and Land O'Lakes 
products were not to be found on the same grocers' shelves, this 
division of territory eliminating any competition between the two 
cooperatives. In 1930 over three-fourths of Challenge dry milk was 
sold through Land O'Lakes in eastern markets (21). It has been 
said that two carloads of Challenge butter arriving on the New York 
market in 1 day would break the price, while if sent to Land 
O'Lakes and marketed discreetly, the price would not be affected.31 
~hen the Federal Farm Board (23) came into existence it ap-
29This figure was "over 95 percent of all products" at the close of 1933. Ad-
dress of John. Brandt (27). This figure excluded sales to bakeries, ice cream com-
panies and similar sales outlets (in unbranded form) since "it is diffieult to classify 
sales to such organizations as either jobber or direct retail sales." (Letter of Oct. 
7, 1938 to author from Brandt). 
30Land O'Lakes had earlier (1n4) denied its intention to take over this func-
tion: " ... this Association [emphatically does not] ... contemplate merchandising 
its own butter in the principal markets." (52-g) This statement was obviously made 
to appease somewhat the wrath of the old-line wholesalers at the threat to their 
well-being which this new organization potentially offered. 
3'Interview with Mr. A. E. Engbretson, Secretary of Interstate Associated 
Creameries of Oregon. 
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proved of the arrangement which Land O'Lakes and Challenge had 
and sought to further such regional sales agencies, insisting that 
cooperatives should not compete. In the state of Washington for 
some years before about 10 cooperatives of Washington and Idaho 
had marketed through the Consolidated Dairy Products Corporation, 
a private corporation in which an individual owned 51 percent of 
the stock, the cooperatives 49 percent. In the wave of cooperative 
enthusiasm which the Federal Farm Board brought about, this group 
of cooperatives borrowed nearly a million dollars from the board in 
order to buy the privately-owned 51 percent of the stock and become 
strictly cooperative as the United Dairymen's Association. Mean-
while, several unattached Oregon cooperative creameries were seek-
ing federal loans, as was Challenge. The board, in line with its 
policy of refusing to loan unless there was coordination in 
the market and absence of competition among cooperatives, told 
the cooperatives ' to reach an agreement as to division of territory 
and told the (nine) Oregon creameries either to join Challenge or 
United or to form their own regional sales agency. The Oregon 
group chose the latter, so that the final outcome was three western 
cooperative sales agencies, one serving roughly the state of Wash-
ington, a second approximately the state of Oregon, and the third 
and largest, the remainder of the territory west of the Rockies, with 
all competition between cooperatives eliminated. Besides loans to 
these three organizations and to Land O'Lakes, the Farm Board 
granted a loan to the latter in January, 1930, to enable it tempor-
arily to withhold its own product from the market and to "peg" the 
price on the exchange. These operations never reached more than 
5.2 million pounds, but apparently had an importance out of all 
proportion to their size. 3 2 By March 15 prices stiffened and Land 
O'Lakes disposed of its holdings at a profit (56) . Although 
Land O'Lakes controlled only about 6.4 percent of the total United 
TABLE 4. DISTRIBUTION OF BUTl'ER SALES FROM MANUFACTURING 
PLANTS, 1929* 
Channels of primary distribution 
To own wholesale branches 
To industrial and other large users 
To wholesalers and jobbers 
To own retail stores 
To retailers (including chain stores) 



























" Census of Business, Distribution of Manufacturers' Sales, U. S. Dept. of Com-
merce. Bureau of the Census, April, 1937, table 1, p. 34 (68). 
- -32The cooperative, fortified with the government loan. was able to offer to buy 
92 and 93-score butter at the market quotation, but it found no buyers, indicating 
speculative operatiDns (56). Furthermore, as Black (55-a) has pointed out, "autumn 
stocks were low that year due to poor pastures." As to this means of pegging the 
price, Black (55-b) found "nothing remarkable ... any agency with adequate financial 
backing could do the same at any time. It need only buy all offered for sale below 
that price." (boldface mine.) 
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Fig. 1. Primary channels of hutter distribution, 1929. (Based on table 4.) 
States production of creamery butter, the existing pricing mechanism, 
under which the exchange of a relatively minute proportion of all 
butter sets the price for the whole, no doubt made some degree of 
price control feasible, provided adequate financial resources were 
available. 
In 1929 the first quantitative measurements of the marketing 
channels for butter became available with the first census of distri-
bution. Table 4 gives the distribution of butter sales from manu-
facturing plants as to channels of primary distribution_ It may be 
seen that by 1929 only 39.6 percent of butter production went the 
less direct route via wholesalers and jobbers, while 45.3 percent was 
sold direct to the retailer or through the manufacturer's own whole-
sale branches. The remaining 16.1 percent was sold directly to the 
ultimate consumer (large-scale or household) or through the manu-
facturer's own retail stores. These channels are pictured in fig_ l. 
Sales negotiated through agents, brokers and commission houses were 
not obtained in 1929, so this channel has been omitted. It is a 
relatively small item, however. Concerning this tabulation, the 
wholesale dealers have argued that their position is understated. 3 3 
They based this claim on the alleged fact that " many of the in-
dependent distributors represent manufacturers and they are the 
contact with the ultimate retailer ... [and] upon a very small cost 
have allowed the manufacturer to sell direct to the retailer." Further-
-:33Record of Hearing on Proposed Butter Marketing Agreement, A. A. A. Docket 
No. 32 (59), testimony of representatives of the N ational Association of Butter and 
Egg Distributors. These dealers were seeking representation for the trade and the 
hundreds of small creamer ies whom they served on the proposed "National Butter 
Board." which tentatively called for five members from the American Association of 
Creamery Butter Manufacturers (composed chiefly of the larger centralizer creameries) 
and five from the National Cooperative Milk Producers' Federation (of which the 
large cooperative marketing associations were members). all representing interests 
which marketed direct to the retailer. The dealers demanded 4 out of the 10 members 
of the board, since they (independent distributors) "market in excess of 50 percent 
of a ll butter manufactured in the United States." The marketing agreement was 
never put into effect, So the issue never was settled. 
344 
more, "much of that butter which the manufacturer-distributor sells 
through his own distributing outlet is handled through the indepen-
dent distributors." Finally, of the butter manufactured by milk 
plants in the surplus season, not covered by the census, 3 4 the inde-
pendent distributors claimed "the bulk." From the two chief direct 
channels, therefore, the wholesale dealers claimed at least 11 or 12 
percent, which would put them past 50 percent. The true quantitative 
importance of these claims is, of course, purely conjectural, although 
it is obvious that the dealers had the desire to stretch the figure as 
much as possible in order to maximize their own importance in the 
marketing picture. 
An important offsetting factor to the wholesalers' claims is the 
volume of butter sold by many small local manufacturers to the 
wholesale branches of large scale manufacturer-distributors. These 
would probably be considered as wholesaler-jobbers by the local 
creameries, rather than as wholesale branch agencies which were 
buying directly to increase the volume of the direct sales of the 
products of the integrated concerns of which they were a part. The 
wholesaler-jobber channel, therefore, probably includes some of the 
wholesaling business of the manufacturer-distributors as well as that 
of the regular old-line wholesale houses. Figure 1 (and 3) is, there-
fore, oversimplified, since it fails to distinguish between local manu-
facturing plants and large scale manufacturer-distributors, which not 
only manufacture and distribute their own butter, but also buy but-
ter from other (chiefly local ) manufacturing plants. If the reader 
is interested in greater detail as to the many sources of supply for 
butter purchases and sales outlets for the different types of market-
ing business units, he may wish to refer to data now available in a 
recently published report of the federal trade commission (62-d), 
some of which are presented in the next section of this study. 
SUMMARY 
The most important development of 1928-30 was the rise of the 
large dairy corporations and their marked trend toward product-
diversification and territorial expansion. The largest butter central-
izer, Beatrice Creamery Co., embarked on a diversified program of 
dairy and poultry products according to the example being set by 
the two largest dairy corporations, National Dairy Products and 
Borden, and in less than 3 years acquired nearly 100 other com-
panies. By 1930 ice cream, fluid milk and cold storage occupied co-
ordinate positions with butter in the company's business, with eggs 
of somewhat less importance. Fairmont, the second largest central-
izer, also diversified but on a much less extensive scale. This trend 
toward diversification and territorial expansion was encouraged by 
the hope for greater stability and earning power which a whole chain 
of complementary and supplementary relationships made economic-
34The census cQv-:!red only those "engaged primarily in making butter." 
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ally desirable. While National Dairy Products' and Borden's prim 
ary interest was not (and never had been) butter, they produced or 
distributed a very large volume in the aggregate by 1930, by which 
time they ranked among the nation's largest butter distributors. 
The meat packers were meanwhile assuming still greater im-
portance in the dairy field, Armour and Swift probably being the 
largest butter-marketing companies in the United States during 1928-
30. The big packers were also very large distributors of cheese, and 
Armour was manufacturing condensed milk in its two Wisconsin 
factories. 
While the chain stores had been selling rapidly increasing 
amounts of butter, no one of the five largest chains was producing 
more than a minor proportion of its butter in its own plants, al-
though three of the five had acquired one or more creameries during 
1928-30. A tendency toward integration back to and including the 
manufacturing stage of butter was, therefore, very slight, although 
the trend toward company manufacture of evaporated milk was al-
ready very marked. 
Land O'Lakes by 1930 was one of the three largest distributors 
of butter in the United States, and practically all of its products 
sold to retail outlets were sold direct through 15 sales branches just 
established. Challenge, too, was marketing a very large volume of 
butter direct to retailers. In 1928 the two cooperatives reached a 
working agreement involving the division of territory so as to elim-
inate competition between the two cooperative organizations. The 
Federal Farm Board approved of this arrangement and two other 
Pacific Coast regional sales agencies were formed on a similar basis 
by Washington and Oregon cooperatives. In the difficult times of 
1930 all four of these cooperative butter agencies received loans 
from the Farm Board, and Land O'Lakes' very large organization 
was used by the Board to "peg" butter prices for a few months. 
By 1929 only 39.6 percent of the country's butter moved through 
the once-dominant wholesaler-jobber channel, the remainder being 
distributed through more direct channels integrated as far as the 
retailer or even the ultimate consumer. 
THE DEPRESSION YEARS: 1931-1937 
While the Federal Farm Board's first experience in financing 
the holding operations of large-scale cooperatives had proved suc-
cessful, a second was not. Black (55-a) has observed that "the two 
years of such operations proved a heavy drain on the accumulated 
surplus of the cooperative in question [Land O'Lakes], and it dis· 
continued its holding policy for the time being."35 
- -35According to Black (55-b): "The principal difference between [these] Farm 
Board operations and the 1933 butter operations [of the AAA] is tbat the Farm 
Board had to contend with a very elastic foreign market. a market that went to 
other countries for its supplies when our prices were held out of line with the world 
market. As a result. prices were probably depressed later by accumulated stocks 
as much as they were temporarily raised by the pegging operations. In the recent 
experience with butter a way of disposing of purchases [relief] was found from the 
start. and Drices were subsequently maintained . ,t 
As already noted, the Agricultural Adjustment Administration 
never consummated a butter marketing agreement, although the pre-
liminary steps toward it were taken. Government aid was limited, 
therefore, to considerable purchases of butter for relief purposes. 36 
Between August, 1933, and April, 1934, 51.6 million pounds of but-
ter were purchased by the government through its Federal Surplus 
Relief Corporation and two private organizations, Land O'Lakes and 
the Dairy Marketing Corporation, which acted as brokers or buying 
agents on the central markets for the government, buying on con-
fidential orders from, and financed by, the government. This pur-
chase program reduced excessive holdings without affecting the long-
time situation as a whole. 37 Inability of producer groups to reach 
agreement prevented the expected attack on overproduction follow-
ing these surplus-removal operations. Black (55-a) has estimated 
that the government purchases "may have raised the average annual 
price to producers by a cent or two per pound, but probably did n 'J t 
raise it more than a cent."38 
Relatively small and declining quantities of butter were pur-
chased by the government, through its Federal Surplus Commodities 
Corporation, in the storage years (May to April) 1934-35, 1935-36, 
and 1936-37, purchases falling to 1.7 million pounds in the latter 
year (appendix table VII), as butter prices recovered with improved 
general business conditions. As a result of the severe recession (with 
its repercussions on butter prices) in mid-1937, however, 9.8 million 
pounds were purchased in 1937-38. 
Between May and September, 1938 (inclusive ), purchases on 
the biggest scale in the history of the AAA were made, with the 
FSCC taking 16.8 million pounds of butter, all of which was 
shunted over into relief channels. The Dairy Products Marketing 
Association (the government-financed private organization) pur-
chased 99 million pounds during the same period. This latter fi gure 
does not include 10 million pounds resold by the D. P. M. A. to the 
FSCC (included in the 16.8 million pounds quoted above). 
Plans have been made for the FSCC to take over additional but-
ter from D. P. M. A. for relief purposes. 
"While the D. P. M. A. program provides for resale of butter 
held by the Association to the trade at prices representing a moder-
ate seasonal increase that is more than enough to cover the purchase 
- - 36" .. • the price of butter can [undoubtedly] be raised if large quantities are 
purchased and distributed as relief food for the unemployed, since without such 
relief aid they would consume much less butter" (ibid.. 55-c). 
37Except insofar as more producers were kept in business by the Government's 
program than under a policy of "laissez-faire." 
38Land O'Lakes and the butter dealers were ugreatly helned." however. "At the 
time that butter buying was begun In August, 1933, Land O'Lakes Creameries. Inc .. 
was holding sizable stock. of butter. as were butter dealers generally. They had bePn 
led astray by the pseudo-inflation of the early summer. The increase in price to 24 
cents, and the accompanying government purchases, greatly helped the cooperative 
and the dealers" (ibid). 
For an excellent detailed analysis of the Government's butter operRtions and 
activities. 1933-3&, see Black (55), Chap, XII, pp. 350-363: and Chap. XIII ("Pro-
duction Control"), pp, 873-892. 
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TABLE 5. BEATRICE CREAMERY CO .: PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL SALES AND 
TOTAL NET EARNINGS A CCORDING TO PRODUCT AND PROFIT MARGIN, 
19311; PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL NET EARNINGS, 193() AND 1936. 
I 1935" 
Percent Percent Net 
Product total Percent of profit 
earn- of Net total margin 
ings Sales total earnings net (earnings 
;;:-:.,--___ I _c~. 1929' (000) sales (000) earnings to sales) 
Butter 30%- $26,470 46.3% $14~ 14.2% o.5~ 
Milk 20 9,285 16.2 36 3.6 0.4} 
Ice cream 30 6,525 15.5 490 49.4 7.5 
Cold storage _ .. -......... t' . I 155 15.6 ( \ Eggs } 8 912 11 3 -130(d) -13.1(d) - 14.6(d) I 
~r:~f~:e"ous .. ~~ .. \ _6,000 10.5 I 2~~ 2~:~ \ 8.5 J 









*Fortune, June 1936, p. 129. The exact year is not known, the magazine saying 
merely "a few years ago." The year 1929 is chosen because this was the last year 
before butter prices broke, presumably with ill effects on profits from butter. 
"Year ended Feb. 28, 1936. Earnings breakdown ("unofficial") in Fortune, June 
1936, p. 85. 
··'United Business Service Letter, Oct. 31, 1937 (by permission). 
(d) loss. 
prices plus costs of operation and storage, none has been resold to 
the trade as yet."39 It is, of course, too early to appraise the results 
of this program at the present writing. 
In 1936 Beatrice was the third largest corporation of those whose 
business was limited almost solely to dairy products. Milk and ice 
cream accounted for about 50 percent of the total earnings, butter 
25 percent, cheese, eggs and poultry the remainder.4o Thus ' we find 
an interesting example of the extent to which diversification and 
concentration have now taken place in the dairy industry. For while 
Beatrice is still one of the largest companies in volume of butter, its 
butter sales at a recent date made up only 25 percent of its profits. 
Table 5 illustrates the important factor of greater stability which 
diversification brings. 
Around 1929 butter accounted for approximately 30 percent of 
Beatrice's total net earnings. In 1935, although 46 percent of the 
company's sales were butter, this product brought in only 14 percent 
of net earnings, with a net profit margin of only 0.5 percent, In 
1936 butter earnings apparently again reached a higher relative 
position at 25 percent of total earnings. 
Fluid milk was responsible for 20 percent of net earnings in 
1929, but also carried a very low margin of profit in 1935, bringing 
in only 3.6 percent of earnings in spite of representing 16 percent 
of total sales. No separate figure is available for 1936. Eggs brought 
large losses in 1935. Cold storage earnings were 15,6 percent of the 
total in 1935, while orangeade and miscellaneous products41 brought 
30E. W , Gaumnitz, Chief of the Dairy Section, AAA. Letter to author, Oct. 
4, 1938. 
40United Business Service letter (11) (used by permission). These figures are 
probably only approximations. 
41 Cheese, poultry, oleomargarine, fish and oysters. 
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in 30.3 percent of the earnings, being sold (on the average) at a 
substantial margin of profit of 8.5 percent. 
But the consistent money.maker-in spite of being a luxury good, 
the consumption of which dropped very sharply after 1929-was 
ice cream, which accounted for 30 percent of earnings in 1930 and 
49 percent in 1935, although it composed only 15 percent of total 
sales in the latter year. It made a substantial margin of profit of 
7.5 percent in 1935. Milk and ice cream were not reported separate· 
ly in 1936, although it is probable milk gained somewhat in im· 
portance relative to ice cream in that year. 
It is readily seen, in the light of this analysis, that Beatrice has 
been greatly strengthened by producing and distributing other prod. 
ucts than butter, especially in time of depression,42 when relatively 
high margins on ice cream, cold storage and miscellaneous products 
have gone far to offset very low margins or actual losses in butter, 
fluid milk and eggs. At other times, when the market conditions for 
the several products are in a considerably different relationship, 
butter and fluid milk can contribute their full share to a profitable 
business. Beatrice at no time between 1930 and 1936 showed a net 
deficit before dividends. From 1932 on Beatrice (like the Borden 
Company) made no further expansions, so that in 1936 it had ap-
proximately the same number of units as at the close of 1931 (table 
3 above). In addition it had 68 sales branches in 20 states (9-c). 
So far as its buttf,r enterprise was concerned, Beatrice had 36 plants 
with a capacity of about 4 million pounds each (3).4 3 In 1935 Beat-
rice sold 95.1 million pounds of butter, 63.2 percent of which was 
produced in its own factories (7-a). While the total volume of sales 
was about the same as in 1929 and 1930, there had been about a 10 
percent decline in the proportion from its own factories. Beatrice's 
share of total American factory butter, however, fell from 6.1 to 
5.2 percent between 1930 and 1935. 
Fairmont Creamery Co., another large butter concern, ranked 
fourth in sales (after Beatrice) among American dairy corporations 
in 1936. In this year it had 31 manufacturing plants, 2 distributing 
plants, 5 sales branches and 7 sales offices (49-e). This represented 
almost a doubling of the number of manufacturing plants in 10 
years (but only a few of which were additional creamery plants) 
and a considerable extension of its own distributing facilities, not 
only in the East but also in the South and far West. The company 
had four cold storage warehouses. In addition each manufacturing 
branch was equipped with cold storage facilities and was doing some 
public business. The company also owned a number of retail ice 
42In depression butter always bears the brunt of price collapse in dairy products. 
because of the increased surpluses of milk (largely turned into butter) brought about 
by the decline in the consumption of fluid milk and by increased milk production. 
43The discrepancy between this figure and "41" butter units given in table 3 
is not believed to represent a decline in number of plants. but rather a difference 
of meaning between the terms "unit" (see table 3) and "plant" (where butter i. 
the major product). 
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cream and dairy stores (10), and was distributing cheese, poultry 
and eggs. Fairmont, too, had diversified, although it was still prim-
arily in the field of butter manufacture and produce distribution. In 
1934 it was producing around 70 million pounds of butter a year 
(53-c) . 
Relatively little information is available concerning Blue Valley 
Creamery Co., since it is closely held, so that no information appears 
in the leading investment manuals. In 1933 (2), however, it had 23 
plants in 17 states. In two ways other than its secrecy this company 
is unique. It has continued to operate primarily on the direct-ship-
per system, without cream stations, since its beginning, and it has 
never joined the centralized creamery trade association, in spite of 
its size. This company has shown little growth since 1924, with only 
two more plants now than then and still producing "between 30 and 
40 million pounds." Its method of procuring cream has probably not 
been such as to make rapid growth possible. 44 
For National Dairies and Borden, butter has been somewhat inci-
dental to certain other dairy products. Fluid milk particularly has 
been more important for both of these firms, cheese and ice cream 
more important for National Dairies, and concentrated milks more 
important for Borden. The volume of their butter sales, however, 
has become large in the aggregate. In 1934 Borden sold 88.7 million 
pounds of butter (7-a). Nevertheless, Borden (31-b) blamed its 
poor financial showing in 1935 on "current operating losses of the 
Produce Division, together with the losses attending the liquidation 
of certain of its operations. . . [However] ... the scope of this 
division's operations have [now] ... been greatly curtailed, policies 
and methods changed, and certain of its unprofitable operations dis-
continued and liquidated." As a result of this action, in 1936 (31-c) 
there was a "profit in that division for the first time in five years."45 
This division included not only butter but also cheese, poultry and 
eggs, but butter was one of the products the production of which was 
greatly curtailed. Following this curtailment only 11.7 percent of 
Borden's butter (7-a) was produced in its own factories. The volume 
of butter distributed still remained large, however, since many of 
the production units sold continued to sell through Borden's distri-
bution system. 
National Dairy Products Corporation, unlike Borden and Beat-
rice, acquired a number of companies in 1932 and following years. 
Between Jan. 1, 1932, and June, 1936, this company acquired 41 
additional concerns. Almost all of these acquisitions, however, were 
additions to National Dairies' huge cheese and ice cream divisions, 46 
with apparently no additions to its butter department. In 1934 
National Dairies sold 92.3 million pounds of butter, 86.2 percent of 
- - 4- 4Since 1933 Blue Valley is reported to have begun using .cream stations to 
some extent. 
45It was also said that fluid milk contributed 11 percent of that year's profits. 
46In 1934 this corporation ma nufactured and sold 21 percent of the ice cream 
and distributed one-third of the cheese of the United States (32). 
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which was produced in its own plants (7-a), a decline in volume of 
7 to 8 percent since 1930. As a percentage of total butter produc-
tion, National Dairies' share showed a decline of about the same 
order as Beatrice's between 1930 and 1934~from 6.2 to 5.4 percent. 
To give some notion of the extent of the expansion of National 
Dairy Products, Borden, Beatrice and Fairmont, Hoffman (33) has 
stated that "as of 1925 the combined sales of these four companies 
represented 15 percent of the estimated value of dairy products as 
given by census figures; in 1929, 35 percent; and in 1935, 39 per-
cent."47 A study of financial statements of some of these corpor-
ations seems to indicate that long-term investors have benefited little. 
Apparently those stockholders of one or more decades ago who have 
retained their stock to date are little better off (or in some cases, are 
worse off) under the grossly expanded organizations of today. 
In 1934-35 the three largest dairy corporations sold approximate-
ly 16.3 percent of the nation's butter. The nine largest dairy com-
panies sold 24.2 percent (7-b). These data exclude meat packers. 
In 1936 Armour was operating 53 produce plants, a net decline 
of six plants since 1930. Of these plants, the number of creameries 
apparently dropped from 27 to 24 (53-d.) 48 This was brought 
about through the shutting-down of a number of plants because of 
lack of sufficient volume or because of unsatisfactory financial re-
turns. The decreased volume in certain butter plants was brought 
about by increased competition (especially by cooperatives) for the 
cream,49 and by severe drouths in several important produce areas. 
Furthermore, Armour was finding it difficult in some of its plants to 
manufacture butter, on the centralizer principle, which would meet 
quality standards such as competition made necessary for its nation-
ally-advertised "Cloverbloom" brand. Instead the Company has 
found it more satisfactory and economical to increase its purchases 
from cooperatives and other manufacturers of butter of the grade 
and quality desired. In 1936 the produce business, it was reported, 
was "steadily growing in importance." During this year, an agree-
ment was reached with Land O'Lakes under which Armour (38) takes 
a certain amount of the cooperative's 92-score butter to sell as 
"Cloverbloom" and distributes the higher-grade "Land O'Lakes" 
brand in territory where the latter's own distributing system fails to 
reach. 
--.!.he extent of Armour's produce activities was indicated by For-
47This is admittedly a rather uneatisfactory comparison, for as we have seen, 
a considerable proportion of the sales of these dairy corporations is the sale of poultry. 
eggs, stora.ge space, beverages and other non.dairy products. However. it is of some 
use in roughly indicating the trend toward concentration in the dairy industry. 
48Including subsidiaries, this drop was from 29 to 27, according to an Armour 
official. Since both sources indicate the same trend (our chief interest), this dis-
crepancy in the absolute figures is less serious. 
49In Iowa, for example, several Armour creameries have in recent years been 
forced to change their method of procuring cream from stations to cream trucking-
routes, because nearby ,cooperatives had been adopting this latter form of cream 
procurement in rapidly increasing numbers , offering the farmer the added service of 
farm-gate coUection and obtaining thereby a better cream from which a higher-quality 
product could be made. 
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tune (37) for the year 1933. 50 These unofficial figures place Ar-
mour's produce volume in that year as follows: 90 million pounds 
of butter, 80 million pounds of cheese, 90 million dozen eggs and 70 
million pounds of poultry. The value of its produce business was 
estimated at 59 million dollars, which would be 13 percent of its 
total sales for that year. Armour also sold 23 million pounds of 
oleomargarine in 1933 (through its by-products division). The Com-
pany's produce division was, according to Fortune, a "depression 
liability," it being asserted that, taking 1924-33 as a unit, produce 
had lost a little more than it had gained. This statement seems to 
check with the experiences of the largest dairy corporations. In 
1935 Armour distributed 119.8 million pounds of butter (40-a) or 
7.3 percent of the nation's factory butter in that year. 
In 1935 Swift and Company had 113 produce plants, about 40 
percent more than in 1930. "The Company's proportion of the total 
poultry, eggs, butter, and cheese entering [U. S.] trade channels 
[was] less than 10 percent" (47). However, Swift easily led all 
other companies in the volume of butter distributed- 137.6 million 
pounds (40-a) or 8.4 percent of total factory production in the 
United States- in that year. Swift now had field service men to 
help producers with quality problems at most of its produce plants. 
In 1935 Swift was producing 59.5 percent of its volume of butter 
sales compared with Armour's 49.0 percent (40-a). Swift's con-
tinued expansion into manufacturing while Armour was shifting 
somewhat out of this end of the produce business is not fully clear. 
However, over a period of 30 years or more, Swift has always manu-
factured a greater proportion of its butter than Armour. Further-
more, Swift is reported to have picked up a number of "bargains" 
during the past few lean years. Swift's ice cream division also 
showed rapid growth after 1930, with 21 ice cream units in 1937 
(53-d) . 
The most definite statement concerning the two leading meat 
packers' operations in dairy products was recently made by Hoff-
man (43): "Large-scale handling of dairy products is not confined 
to the ... dairy companies. The meat packers have for years been 
important factors in the distribution of butter and cheese. The two 
big packers (Swift and Armour) rank next to the National Dairy 
Products Corporation and the Borden Company in volume of dairy 
products handled." Thus two meat packers, with whom dairy prod-
ucts are merely a "side-line," are outstripped in volume of dairy 
products by only two, strictly speaking, dairy corporations at the 
present time, and lead even these in butter sales. In 1934, National 
Dairies handled dairy products which represented 9.4 percent of 
50 "Unofficial estimates." These figures indicate that of the nation's cheese. 
Armour handled about 15 percent in 1933, and of the oleomargarine, about 10 percent, 
as compared with about 5 percent of the butter. Later figures by the federal trade 
commission (see text) indicate Fortune's estimates were too low. 
By 1937 Armour owned between 15 and 20 branch cheese factories, largely in the 
South (53-d). 
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United States commercial milk production. Borden, Swift and 
Armour followed with 6.8, 4.9 and 4.7 percent, respectively. After 
these came Beatrice with 3.0 percent and Fairmont with 2.5 percent 
(40·b) . 
In 1935 Cudahy had not expanded its number of produce plants 
further than in 1930, the number still being 11. Production of meat 
and meat products "constituted over 90 percent of the company's 
business" (49·f). No information regarding volume of produce 
handled by Cudahy is available but if less than 10 percent of total 
sales is produce, as indicated by this statement, Cudahy probably 
handles about one· fifth to one-fourth the value of produce that 
Armour does. Wilson and Company had 13 produce plants (10) 
and the volume of its dairy.product sales is of about the same order 
as that of Cudahy, each handling the equivalent of 1.0 percent of 
the nation's commercial milk in 1934 (40·b). Since Cudahy leads 
Wilson in cheese volume (40-c) , the latter probably leads Cudahy 
in butter sales. 
From the two sources just cited, it is estimated that Cudahy dis· 
tributed in 1935 about 25 million pounds of butter. Wilson distrib· 
uted 28 million pounds (40.d). In 1934·35 the three meat packers 
most important in dairy products distributed 16.8 percent of the 
nation's butter, while the 10 largest such packers distributed 18.7 
percent (40·d). 
After reaching a peak of 15,737 stores in 1931, the number of 
stores in the A. and P. chain had fallen to slightly over 15,000 in 
1936, but it still had about three times as large a volume of sales 
as the second largest chain organization, Safeway. A. and P. prop· 
erty in 1936 included 39 produce warehouses, 4 butter warehouses, 
3 cheese plants, 1 creamery, 1 canning condensery and 10 condens· 
ing sub·stations (10). Butter is one of the A. and P. commodities 
which has its own division and does not come in contact with other 
products such as cheese, dried milk, eggs, etc. This department has 
verbal agreements with creameries and centralizers to receive ship. 
ments of butter on the basis of the Chicago "Extra" (92·score or 
above), the Chicago "Standard" (90·score carlot), or the New York 
"Extra" quotation, according to grade of butter and location of 
receiving warehouse. These creameries and centralizers are, of 
course, free to ship elsewhere whenever they desire, and the chain 
organization can likewise refuse their butter. 51 
In 1936 the A. and P. sold 149,929,000 pounds of butter as com· 
pared with 162 million pounds in 1935, 183 million pounds in 1933, 
and 204 million pounds in 1932. As percentages of total American 
creamery butter production, these amounts were 9.2 percent in 1936, 
9.9 percent in 1935, 10.4 percent in 1933 and 12.0 percent in 1932. 
Thus, while a single organization, the A. and P., has brought from 
9 to 12 percent of American butter to the final consumer in recent 
~For this detailed data of A. and Po's butter operations the author is deeply 
indebted to R. E. Eldred of the Company's Chicago butter warehouse. 
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years, its share of the whole has been definitely declining during 
that period. 52 Even in 1936, however, the A. and P., although manu-
facturing a negligible amount of butter, was probably without ques-
tion the country's largest butter-distributing organization, integrated 
through the retailer if not back through the manufacturing stage. 
What, then, are the sources of supply of this gigantic butter mer-
chant? Centralizers furnish approximately 50 percent, local cream-
eries (largely cooperative) 40 percent and meat packers approx-
imately 10 percent. 53 Since the meat packers probably distribute 18 
percent or more of the nation's butter, it appears likely that this 
one chain-store organization, at least, buying only 10 percent of its 
supplies from packers, does not offer the proportionately most fav-
orable outlet for the packer's butter. That this is true for chain 
stores in general, since the latter, having well-integrated butter-dis-
tributing departments, do not need to depend on the packers' exten-
sive distribution systems as do many of the independent merchants, 
is strikingly shown by recent trade commission data (62-a). Of 12 
leading dairy companies' sales of butter direct to retail outlets, 83.2 
percent went to chain stores, 5.3 percent to voluntary chains and 
11.5 percent to independent retail stores. Of the butter of 10 meat 
packers most important in dairy products, only 9.6 percent went to 
chain stores, 2.4 percent to voluntary chains, while independent 
merchants received 88.0 percent. 
A. and P.'s butter department has its own country buyers or 
solicitors and receives the major part of its butter direct from the 
manufacturer, although at times it does buy on the open market 
through brokers or wholesalers. During the heavy-production months 
of May and June the company stores a great deal of butter for use 
during the months of low production. The company does not own 
its own cold storage warehouses, however. It endeavors to control 
quality by the maintenance of a laboratory where analyses and tests 
of composition and quality are made, by careful inspection and per-
sonal contact with manufacturers through its five field men, three of 
whom are in Iowa, one in Minnesota and one in Wisconsin. A. and 
P. still owns and operates only one creamery and this has thus far 
been used chiefly for experimentation. Apparently the success of 
this creamery has not been such as to encourage further integration 
52In February, 1938, A. and P,'s number of stores had fallen to 13,30{}-a 
decline of about 11 percent since 1936 and the lowest number since 1925 (49-g). The 
other large chains showed similarly marked drops. One important reason for this 
decline has no doubt been the rapidly spreading chain-store taxes of recent years, 
which taxes 'are progressively heavier as the number of stores increases. Should this 
new development continue, it may, by cutting down the number of outlets and the 
volume of butter sold, force direct buying operations to be curtailed. A second im-
portant reason has been the increasing substitution of super-markets for a greater 
number of ordinary stores. 
53Accordingly A. and P . bought directly from local creameries about 60 million 
pounds in 1936; 65 million pounds in 1935; 77 million pounds in 1933; and 82 million 
pounds in 1932 (40 percent of its total sales in each of these years). These figures 
are roughly the net . amount added t o direct-marketing channels by A. and P. To 
count centralizer and packer butter would involve double counting. 
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back to the manufacturing stage for butter, since 9 years have passed 
without any additional creameries being acquired or built. 
Butter is concentrated by rail at the four butter warehouses lo-
cated at Chicago, Philadelphia, New York City and Springfield, 
Mass. At these warehouses it is graded, weighed, sampled, printed 54 
and packed. It is then shipped to eight divisional warehouses,55 
from which it is shipped to local warehouses for distribution to the 
stores. Excepting storage stock, all butter is distributed to the various 
retail units within a period of a few days. A retail-store manager 
makes known his butter needs by sending a "perishables" order to 
the divisional, which in turn sends the order on to one of the central 
butter warehouses. It is estimated that 99.5 percent of A. and P. 
butter sales are sold under its own exclusive company brands. 
As the A. and P. has grown in size, its butter-handling facilities, 
both as to space and equipment, have increased apace, and its 
volume of butter sales has made possible the maintenance of a large 
direct-buying force and the establishment of a modern laboratory 
for quality control. 
The second largest chain in volume of sales in 1936 was Safe-
way Stores with 3,370 stores, a gain of nearly 20 percent over 1930. 
Along with its continued expansion, most of which came between 
1929 and 1931, Safeway had increased its number of creameries 
from two to six and had acquired its own condensery. The total 
volume of butter sold by Safeway is not known, but, since California 
creameries are usually quite large, Safeway probably now produces 
a significant part of its butter. Third in volume of sales and second 
in number of stores, Kroger had 4,250 retail units in 1936, a marked 
decline (24 percent) from the peak reached in 1930. 56 Kroger was 
still operating its milk units and in 1937 began operation of its own 
evaporated milk plant. 
First National Stores, fourth in volume of sales and fifth in 
number of stores (2,556) in 1936, had experienced a decline of about 
6 percent in number of retail units since its peak was reached in 
1933. It still had its creameries in the Midwest and in 1937 leased 
a Wisconsin evaporated milk plant. American Stores, a close fifth 
in volume of sales and fourth in number of stores (a 7 percent gain 
over 1930 with 2,826) in 1936, now had its own produce company 
to act as the chain organization's purchasing agent at St. Paul, Minn .. 
buying butter, cheese and other dairy and poultry products, and 
had continued to operate its evaporated milk plant. 
Around 1934 the three chain stores largest in the volume of but-
54About 95 percent of A. and P.'s packaged butter is printed in its own ware-
houses to be sold tinder its exclusive brands of "Silverbrook" and uSunnyfield." The 
remaining 5 percent is printed by local creameries selling to the A. and P . 
55The divisions are Southern. E astern. New England. Central. Midwestern. 
Central Western and 'Vest (Los Angeles and Seattle). 
56This decline in numbers was brought about by a considerable retrenchment 
and the closing of unprofitable units and duplicating stores (caused by purchases of 
other chains). which helped to raise the average annual profit per store from $347 
in 1930 to $1.106 in 1933. 
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ter sold were A. and P., Kroger and First National, their total sales 
being 231 million pounds or 13.6 percent of United States butter. 
Only 1.3 million pounds were produced in their own factories, 0.6 
percent of sales. Since A. and P. sold about 10 percent of the nation's 
butter in that year, Kroger and First National sold between them 
about 3.6 percent. If the volume of Safeway, American Stores and 
National Tea Co. are added to the three largest chains, it is found 
that these six chains sold 295.5 million pounds of butter, 17.4 per-
cent of total production (12-a). 
In 1935 as in 1929, combined sales of the five largest chains 
amounted to almost 25 percent of the total business done in all gro-
cery and combination stores, as reported by the United States Census 
of Distribution (l5-a). Of the five, only Safeway and First National 
have made an attempt to manufacture in their own factories a sig-
nificant amount of their final volume of butter sales. But all, it will 
be noted, now produce evaporated milk to an important extent. 57 
In 1936 six cooperative sales agencies, according to Fetrow 
(24-c), were representing "creameries manufacturing approximately 
20 percent of the total output of creamery butter in the United 
States." These agencies were Land O'Lakes, Challenge, United Dairy-
men, Interstate, Dairy and Poultry Cooperatives, Inc., and Midwest 
Producers' Creameries, Inc. The latter two, not heretofore men-
tioned, are considered below. "It is estimated that cooperative dairy-
marketing associations handled in 1934 approximately 36 percent 
of the creamery butter manufactured in the United States" (24-d) .58 
From its peak of 101 million pounds in 1930, Land O'Lakes had 
suffered a decline of 26.7 percent by the end of 1936, during which 
year the cooperative sold 74 million pounds. In 1931, 1932 and 
1933, Land O'Lakes sold 98 million pounds, while in 1934 there was 
a sharp drop in volume to 85 million pounds, followed by a further 
drop to 79 million pounds in 1935. As a percentage of total United 
States creamery butter production this represents a decline from 6.3 
percent in 1930 to 4.8 percent in 1936. 
An important part of this recent decline has been brought about, 
it is believed, by a steadily narrowing spread between the prices of 
57Whitehouse Milk Co., a subsidiary of A. and Po, is the third largest manu-
facturer of evaporated milk in the country (15-b). The manufacture of evaporated 
milk has probably attracted the chain stores for two reasons: (1) The possible 
economies of lar&,<,-scale production are much greater than for butter and (2) the 
concentration of control over the evaporated milk industry is much greater than for 
butter 80 that company manufacture is an alternative to paying a price largely 
dictated by the manufacturers of the nationally advertised brands of evaporated milk 
and greatly improves the chains' bargaining power. 
58Fetrow in cluded in this figure not only "federations, large-scale centralized 
organizations, sales agencies and independent service-rendering associations" but also 
"independent local associations" (24-e), the latter as a rule selling through the less 
direct wholesaler route, although the other types of organization presumably market 
most of their product direct to retail outlets. It seems to the writer that most of 
these f'independent local associations" are primarily cooperative manufacturina- asso-
ciations, and do not "market" their butter in the same sense as do the large-scale sales 
agencies, since their management is chiefly equipped for production and not for selling. 
To call them "dairy-marketing" associations is therefore misleading unless this very 
broad use of the term "marketing" is more explicitly called to the attention of the 
reader than is done in thi. bulletin. 
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Fig. 2. Average wholesale prices and spread between prices of 93-score and 
90-score butter, Chicago, 1927-36. (Based on table II, appendix.) 
93-score butter and the lower grades since 1927 (as roughly indicated 
by fig. 2 and appendix table II)-partly the result of depressed eco-
nomic conditions, but apparently still more due to an ever-increasing 
proportion of high-quality butter (92-93 score) during this period 
which could be moved only at an ever-lower price as lower-income 
groups were reached. For while the demand of a small part of the 
consuming population for 92 or 93-score butter is highly inelastic, 
if the quantity offered for sale increases very much-as it apparently 
has since the War-a point is probably soon reached where the dif-
ferential must be narrowed rather rapidly to attract buyers in less 
favorable economic circumstances. Certainly such less-wealthy con-
sumers are even more sensitive to a change in the "spread" between 
the prices of 93-score and a lower grade of butter than they are to 
the relationship between the prices of oleomargarine and butter, 
hence the less-wealthy group's demand for the highest grade of butter 
is sure to be highly elastic. The fact that the differential narrowed 
in 1927-29 and 1933-36 as well as 1930-32 indicates the greater im-
portance of the supply than the demand factor in the downward 
trend in the spread between 93 and 90-score butter from 2.9 cents 
to 1.2 cents between 1927 and 1936. In the face of this increased 
amount of high-quality butter, Land O'Lakes' "quality appeal" was 
made less distinctive with its limited high-price market apparently 
satiated. 59 Furthermore, some of its member-producers were prob-
ably less able or willing to meet the increased costs and care incident 
"nsupra, pp. 334-35. 
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to the production and delivery of cream for a 93-score product as a 
result of receiving a lower premium than they had formerly enjoyed. 
Another factor of some importance in the past several years has 
been the substitution of their own private brands of 93-score butter 
by chain-store organizations. Thus, the Economy Grocery Stores, a 
chain of 412 stores (1936) in Greater Boston, inaugurated in the 
fall of 1936 its own "Ecco 93-score" butter. It has been pushing 
this hard in its advertisements, with major emphasis on the "93-
score" government grade, which appears in very large letters on the 
package. This product has been sold retail alongside of Land O'Lakes 
butter, which is also "93-score" but not nearly so prominently 
marked thus on the package, at the same price or at a cent less per 
pound. There are certain important advantages to a chain-store or-
ganization in having its own brand of butter, since it can thereby 
have an independent price policy made possible by the opportunity 
of "shopping the market" for the desired grade of butter. Further-
more, if it buys from a manufacturer whose brand reaches all the 
way to the consumer and who strives to develop a consumers' prefer-
ence for its product, as has the Land O'Lakes organization, the lat-
ter is in a position to dictate to some extent the retailing chain's price 
policy. 
Between 1929 and 1936 Land O'Lakes membership dropped from 
470 to 4.00 creameries. This loss of creameries is probably due to 
the fact that many creameries were able to receive a higher net price 
by selling to other outlets, especially to chain-store organizations. 
Now that the Land O'Lakes organization has brought about consider-
ably improved quality and has educated farmers and creamery oper-
ators how to maintain such quality, it has frequently happened that 
other outlets open up for this high-quality product-once developed 
- which offer the prospect of higher net returns. This result is 
probably partly due to the uneconomically large overhead whi.ch Land 
O'Lakes must have had to maintain because of its efforts to distribute 
direct to the retailer through its own sales branches. Even though the 
final sale brought a definite premium, the member creamery's net re-
turns may, for this reason, actually have been less than if sold to alter-
native outlets. It seems probable that by 1936 Land O'Lakes had 
carried its direct-distribution system to a point which was unecon-
omical considering its volume of business, lack of sufficient diversi-
fication and large number of scattered outlets. 
In 1936, as already mentioned, Land O'Lakes arranged for 
Armour and Co. to distribute "Land O'Lakes" dairy and poultry 
products in territories not reached by the cooperative's own distrib-
utive system. "The Land O'Lakes organization apparently intends 
to maintain its present branches and to sell as much of its butter as 
possible under its own brand. It has, however, apparently given up 
the idea of maintaining its own brands on all its products right 
through to the retailer or consumer and it is again utilizing in part 
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a private distributional agency. It will be recalled that private dis· 
tributional agencies marketed practically all the butter of Minnesota 
creameries before Land O'Lakes was organized to take over the job 
for its member plants" (50-c). Thus, after reaching a peak of 95-
percent-direct distribution in 1933,60 Land O'Lakes was again turn-
ing to a private agency for aid in distributing its product, although 
merely to another direct-marketing organization, not to the old-line 
wholesaler-jobber of the past. 
Late in 1934 the National Cheese Producers' Federation,61 a 
large cooperative cheese-marketing agency, became a member of 
Land O'Lakes Creameries, and most of its cheese is now marketed 
through this organization_ In 1936 Land O'Lakes sold 24 million 
pounds of cheese. Its poultry, turkey and egg departments also had 
become of importance since 1929 or 1930. 
In 1936 Challenge had 18 member-associations west of the 
Rockies. In 1935 it handled 31 million pounds of butter, as com-
pared with 36 million in its peak year, 1931, a decline of over 14 
percent. It was selling, however, more butter in Los Angeles than 
all the other "jobbers" combined and had distributing plants in 
10 California cities and Salt Lake City (21). The association also 
was marketing cheese, casein, milk powder, fluid and evaporated 
milk. The United Dairymen's Association marketed 15 million 
pounds of butter in 1935 for its dozen dairy cooperatives in Wash-
ington and Idaho and also processed the surplus milk of the Seattle 
fluid-milk cooperative organization. The Association acts as a job-
ber in Seattle and Tacoma and sells at wholesale in California, Alaska 
and elsewhere (24-c). Interstate Associated Creameries was market-
ing for eight cooperative creameries and one milk-marketing organ-
ization in 1936. Its sales in 1935 consisted of 4 million pounds of 
butter and nearly a million pounds of cheese. 
These four regional sales agencies, which had divided their sales 
territory so well under the encouragement of the Farm Board in 
1930, were, however, again invading one another's territory in 1937. 
Land O'Lakes was reported to be soliciting outlets in California, the 
Pacific agencies working independently in the East and up and down 
the whole Pacinc coast once more. 
Dairy and Poultry Cooperatives, Inc. has a membership of about 
20 creameries, including a number of cooperatives of the centralizer 
type, in the central west. It acts solely as a sales agent, with its 
principal office in Chicago and a branch office in New York. Thi" 
organization grew out of a sales agency formed to sell the product 
of Farmers' Equity and Farmers' Union creameries of Nebraska, 
South Dakota and Ohio. 
Midwest Producers' Creameries was formed in 1932 and hence 
is one of the newest regional sales agencies. It acts as sales agent 
60Supra, p. 341. 
61Name chan~ed to Wisconsin Cheese Producer's Federation Cooperative in 1935. 
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for 20 creameries in Michigan, Indiana, Illinois and Tennessee, sell-
ing in 1936 over 24 million pounds. The association seeks advanta-
geous outlets for the products of member creameries and arranges 
terms of sale which are submitted for acceptance or rejection by 
the member creameries. Several member creameries, however, have 
developed their own direct outlets to consumers or retailers, and all 
are free to do so, for Midwest's function is as much that of services 
as of sales. These services include supervision of production methods, 
laboratory analysis, purchase of supplies and equipment, and finan-
cial advice, and are performed at a flat charge of 1fs cent per pound. 
One of the most important cooperative butter-marketing organ-
izations of the country is Iowa State Brand Creameries, Inc. In 1915 
the Iowa state legislature enacted a law authorizing creameries manu-
facturing 93-score butter or better to use the Iowa State Brand in 
selling their output. But it was 1927 before a small group of cream-
eries licensed to use this brand organized into the Iowa State Brand 
Creameries by incorporating under the state's General Corporation 
Law. This organization is a cooperative stock company with the 
stock owned by member creameries, not by individuals. Although 
membership is not confined to local cooperative associations, all but 
a few are cooperative. Member creameries may buy one or more 
shares of stock with the privilege to vote according to the number 
of shares held, although it is not necessary for a creamery to own 
stock in order to do business with the company.62 At present there 
are 68 member creameries in Iowa and 4 in Minnesota. The volume 
of butter sales reached 19.7 million pounds in 1937-38, of which 
about 60 percent was print sales. Cheese sales reached $67,000 and 
creamery supplies (exclusive of butter tubs) $83,000 in the same 
year. 
Butter is not purchased on a pooling basis but rather according 
to an agreed differential based on the Chicago or New York quota-
tions. Although creameries are not under contract with the selling 
organization, only one stockholding member has been lost since the 
organization's beginning. Non-member business is of considerable 
importance, although non-member creameries fail to share in the 
organization's dividends or earnings. 
In spite of certain points of difference from the usual cooperative, 
all the undistributed balance derived from efficient marketing of the 
butter is returned to the member creameries in the form of patron-
age dividends, based on the amount of butter sold to and cheese and 
creamery supplies purchased from the association, so that the organ-
ization is basically cooperative. 
The butter is printed, wrapped and marketed from the main office 
62A brief history of the Iowa State B rand Creameries appeared in the National 
Butter and Cheese Jour nal (25) in 1936. Later data were kindly furnished by R. O. 
Storvick. manager. 
360 
at Mason City where a fully-owned, debt-free main plant is located. 
The butter is marketed from Mason City by a salesman who is con-
tinually making contacts to establish good markets in the East. Thr 
State Brand association has been able to conduct its business success· 
fully without any financial support from either federal or state 
funds. All creameries in Iowa licensed to use the state brand are 
regularly supervised by the Iowa Butter Control, a committee of 
five members, including representatives of the State Department of 
Agriculture, the State Dairy Association, the State Creamery Oper-
ators' Association and Iowa State College. Through rigid creamery 
supervision, butter inspection and laboratory check-up, quality has 
been carefully maintained. 63 
This whole movement toward cooperative large-scale selling has 
been well summarized by Laughlin and Stitts (28) as follows: 
" Changes in marketing channels, with notable shifts of butter buy-
ing into the hands of large operators [during recent years], have 
directed attention to the advantage of having large volumes of stand-
ardized products for sale. Such increased volume has been provided 
either by increased size of manufacturing unit or through centralized 
selling on the part of a number of units" (my italics). 
The beginnings of the movement toward government grading at 
or near the point of production have already been noted. 64 This 
country grading service, as we have seen, was first undertaken at 
Minneapolis and Duluth in a cooperative arrangement between the 
United States Department of Agriculture and Land O'Lakes Cream-
eries. It has since been extended to both cooperative and private but-
ter organizations located at Mankato and St. Paul, Minn., and at Du-
buque and Mason City, Iowa. "At these [six] points, and inclusive of 
a grading station at Chicago, there were graded during the year ended 
June 30, [1937] _ __ 124,4.17,877 pounds of butter. During the past 
12 years the amount of butter graded each year has exceeded 60,-
000,000 pounds" (57)_ 
During the same year 1936-37 a total of 261,283,157 pounds of 
butter was graded at all points by government graders, or about 17 
percent of the total United States creamery butter production_ Hence, 
by 1937, almost as much butter was graded at country points (48.4 
percent) as in the central markets. "The bulk of the butter [graded] 
was 92-score or higher, and much of it was packaged with certifi-
cates of quality that carried its score or grade through to the con-
sumer." 
In 1918 the largest butter marketing company had a volume of 
63Another cooperative marketing organization of some importance in Iowa is 
the South Iowa Cooperative Creameries Association, formed in 1934 with 14 charter-
member creameries. A plant for concentrating and marketing the members' butter 
was built at Keosauqua in 1935, in which year 11 million pounds (mostly 92-score) 
were handled. Most of the Association's butter is printed and concentrated at Keosau-
qua and then marketed in three principal markets, New York, Chicago and San 
Francisco. This organization is strictly cooperative (30). 
6'Supra, p. 331. 
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67 million pounds,6 5 two others above 50 million, while the fourth 
in rank had only 26 million pounds. At the present time Swift and 
Armour distribute 120·140 million pounds; Beatrice, National Dairy 
Products and Borden, between 85 and 100 million pounds; Land 
O'Lakes (cooperative) and Fairmont 70·80 million; with Blue Val-
ley, Cudahy, Wilson, Challenge (cooperative), Dairy and Poultry 
Cooperati ve, and Midwest (cooperative) between 25 and 40 million 
pounds. Besides these manufacturer-distributors, at least one butter 
wholesaling house is known to handle more than 25 million pounds 
- H. C. Christians Company with 30 million pounds (53-c), of which 
only a relatively small part is manufactured by the company. At least 
three other butter wholesale houses 66 probably handle more than 
25 million pounds. These three butter wholesalers, the largest in 
1934 according to the federal trade commission (62-b), handled 
83.3 million pounds in that year, 4.9 percent of the year's produc-
tion. The 10 largest wholesalers handled only 135.7 million pounds 
(8.0 percent of total production), an average volume of only 13.6 
million pounds. 
The A. and P. handles through its own direct-buying facilities 
around 60-65 million pounds, after eliminating centralizer and 
packer butter from its total butter sales to avoid double-counting. 
Probably one or more other chain-store organizations also handles 
by direct-buying (after similar adjustment for centralizer and packer 
butter) 25-40 million pounds. 
There are, then, a minimum of 18 to 20 wholesaling organizations 
(of which three or four are cooperative ) handling over 25 million 
pounds of butter between factory and retailer (or beyond) at pres-
ent compared with six in 1918, while six (one cooperative) exceed 
in vol ume of distribution the largest distributor of that time. The 
shift to larger operators in butter is, then, a fact. But paradoxical 
though it may seem at first, in spite of large increases in volume b) 
the meat packers, Beatrice, Blue Valley and Fairmont, and the rise 
apace of National Dairy Products, Borden and large-scale cooper-
atives since 1918, it is probable that only one company (Swift) now 
distributes any larger share (8.4 percent) of total creamery butter 
prod uction than did Swift (8.2 percent) in that year. The reason, of 
course, is the enormous increase in creamery butter production 
1918-37 when production doubled. This, however, was not a net 
increase since farm butter production fell from 710 million in 1918 
to 562 million pounds in 1933, the last year reported. In 1935 
Swift's volume was 8.4 percent of total butter production, only a 
slight increase over its share in 1918. Armour showed a much greater 
relative gain-from 6.2 to 7.3 percent and from third to second 
place-in the same period. Beatrice's percentage fell from 7.5 to 5.8 
65Swift and Company, table 1, supra , p. 326. 
66Miles Friedman, Inc.; L. D. Schreiber and Company; and Peter Fox Sons 
Company. 
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percent. Blue Valley, Cudahy and Wilson also showed relative de-
clines. In other words, except for Swift and Armour, the volume 
of those butter distributors leading in 1918 and today did not in-
crease so rapidly as total production of creamery butter. Today 1,)J 
million pounds of butter represents not more than 6 percent of the 
total production, compared with about 12 percent in 1918. 
In 1918 the four largest companies distributed 25.1 percent of 
total United States creamery butter; the six largest, 30.8 percent. In 
terms of the present total production of the United States, the four 
largest companies now distribute about 26 percent, the six largest or-
ganizations (including cooperatives) 36-38 percent, the eight largest 
around 46-48 percent and the largest 18-20 organizations between 
60 and 65 percent. The classes for 4, 6 and 8 companies probably in-
clude relatively little duplication, but that for the 18-20 companies 
undoubtedly does, giving too high a percentage in the last group. 
Concentration in the butter industry is much less, therefore, than 
for other manufactured dairy products. 67 Though the butter indus-
try has been characterized by an increased number of large oper-
ators, there has not been a very marked tendency toward an increased 
concentration in the hands of a few companies since 1918, although 
the six largest-especially the two leading meat packers-now hold 
a somewhat stronger position than did the same number of top-rank-
ing butter distributors 20 years ago. 
In 1935 another census of wholesale distribution was taken, 
enabling us to have some actual quantitative measurement of the 
changes in marketing channels, at least since 1929. These data are 
shown in table 6, with the 1929 percentages brought forward from 
table 4 to facilitate a comparison (table 6, last col umn) . 
In 1935 the amount of butter moving through the less direct 
channel via wholesalers and jobbers had fallen from 39.6 percent 
to 35.9 percent, a decline of almost 10 percent. On the other hand, 
the proportion of butter sales moving to the retailer or large-scale 
user either direct or through the manufacturer's own branches had 
increased from 47.6 to 54.7 percent. There was an important shift, 
however, within the more direct marketing group. For sales through 
manufacturers' wholesale branches fell from 22.5 to 19.2 percent, 
while sales direct to retailer increased from 22.8 to 30.5 percent and 
direct to large-scale users from 2.6 to 5.0 percent. Put another way, 
of direct marketings (as far as the retailer or industrial consumer) 
in 1929, 47.2 percent moved via the manufacturer's wholesale 
branches, while in 1935, only 35.1 percent so moved. An important 
factor in this decline was, no doubt, the elimination by the meat 
packers of a considerable proportion of their wholesale branch 
houses, through which not only meats but also produce was handled, 
during the past few years, and the substitution of truck-routes cover-
67Three companies distribute 60 percent of the nation's cheese and six com-
panies 65 percent of the canned milk (7-c). 
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TABLE 6. DISTRIBUTION OF BUTTER SALES FROM MANUFACTURING 
PLANTS, 1935* 
Channels of primary 
distribution 
Total for industry 1 $761,134 1 100.0 
To own wholesale branches 121,806 16.0 
To industrial and other large users 31,944 4.2 
To wholesalers and jobbers·· 228,322 30.0 
To own retail stores 10,248 1.3 
To retailers (inc!. chains) 193,790 25.5 
T=o::.,,::h70:.::u~se=h::..:07.ld=--::.c:.:07n:::su=m=o-=er:.:s=---______ : _----c49,571 6.5 
Total distributed sales 1 635,69lT8a:5 
Transfers to other plants in same \ \ 
company 85,045 11.2 
Sales not allocated to usual channels 1 40,39815.3 
56,853 \ 7.5 
I ~ ~~ .... 
I 
if';;; $ 
-;; :s~ ~,,:§;'" ~ J} ~ ~ ~~ 
No-:Ofplants il<'8:Jl 
1 3408 - 1100.0 
19.2 - 232 -ss - 22.5-
5.0 368 14 2.6 
35.9 2082 29& 39.6 
1.6 217 19 2.3 
30.5 2303 322 22.8 
7.8 1889 39 10.2 
toO.O- I--I--1 1-00~ 
I 307 I 32 I 
1 180 1 11~6 +-1 -
\ 576 \ 23 \ 
*Cer..sus of Business. Distribution of Manufacturers' Sales, U. S. Dept. of Commerce, 
Bureau of the Census, April 1937, t able I, p. 34 (68). 
·" Wholesalers and jobbers take title to the goods, buying and selling on their own 
account; agents, brokers and commission houses act in a purely agential way, 
performing the selling function for others on a commission basis without taking 
title to the goods. 
***"Distributed sales" al,'e "Total net sales" after elimination of inter-plant transfers 
and "Sales not allocated to usual channels." 
ing territories far wider than were possible before improved high-
ways and trucks were available. Large centralized butter companies 
probably did the same thing to some extent. Besides the transporta-
tion factor, the increased importance of chain-stores has taken a 
considerable vol ume of produce (and, for the packers, meats as well) 
away from the hutter companies' sales branch houses, the products 
now moving direct from these companies to the chain organizations' 
branches_ For these two important reasons, manufacturers have 
found it advisable to close down those branches the volume of which 
has been hardest hit. 
The proportion of butter sales moving to manufacturers' own 
retail stores fell from 2.3 to 1.6 percent in the 6-year period_ This 
is, perhaps, a pretty fair measure of how much of their butter the 
chain-stores produce. If so, it corroborates other evidence already 
presented that chain-stores manufacture only a very small part of 
their butter. It also seems to indicate a trend toward even less in-
tegration in this direction so far as butter is concerned. The amount 
of butter passing direct to the household consumer fell from 10.2 
to 7.8 percent of butter sales during the same period. 
The proportion of total net sales (including interplant sales and 
sales outside the usual channels) negotiated through agents, brokers 
and commission houses was 7.5 percent in 1935. In terms of total 
distributed sales (with interplant and extraordinary sales excluded) 
this should be around 6.5 percent (83.5 percent of 7.5 percent). 
However, no information is available to distribute this percentage 
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according to the importance of middlemen of an agential character 
among the various more important marketing channels. 
Another interesting comparison between tables 4 and 6 is the 
number of plants selling exclusively through the several channels 
of distribution in 1929 and 1935. In 1929 there were 76 plants seIl-
ing exclusively through their own branches, in 1935 only 38. The 
number selling exclusively to large-scale users remained unchanged, 
and the number to wholesalers practically so. The number of plants 
seIling exclusively to their own retail stores dropped from 31 to 19, 
and the number so seIling to household consumers from 76 to 39. 
The number of plants of which all sales of butter went only to re-
tailers direct increased from 287 in 1929 to 322 in 1935. The total 
number seIling exclusively through some one channel was 775 in 
1929 and 731 in 1935. 
In fig. 3 is presented the latest chart of marketing channels avail-
able at the present time, as based on the data just discussed. 
More detailed information has recently become available (62-d) 
revealing the true complexity of sources of supply and types of out-
lets of the leading dairy corporations, meat packers, cooperative 
marketing agencies and butter wholesalers. In 1934,35, of butter 
purchased by the 12 leading dairy corporations (excluding packers), 
20.4 percent came from other (largely local) butter manufacturers, 
32.7 percent from marketing cooperatives, 26.1 percent from whole-
salers and 19.1 percent through brokers and the remainder from 
miscellaneous sources. Of their butter sales (including butter pro-
duced in their own plants as well as that purchased from other 
manufacturers) , 22.0 percent was sold to chain stores, 38.7 percent 
to "route cpstomers" (which includes homes, institutions, large-
scale users and independent retail groceries), 16.7 percent to butter 
wholesale houses, 10.3 percent to brokers and 12.3 percent divided 
among a number of other outlets (7-d). 
The 10 meat packers most important in dairy products obtained 
71.4 percent of their butter purchases from other (largely local) 
butter manufacturers, 15.7 percent from marketin~ cooperatives, 
11.7 percent from brokers and 1.3 percent from butter wholesalers. 
Of the sales outlets for the packers' butter, by far the most important 
were its "route customers" (chiefly independent retail grocers, but 
also including institutions and other large-scale users), which took 
78.1 percent. Chain-store organizations took 8.0 percent, brokers 2.8 
percent, wholesalers 0.2 percent and several other outlets 10.9 per· 
cent (40-e). 
These data indicate that the meat packers were much more com-
pletely integrated from factory to retailer than the large dairy 
corporations, both on the buying and selling sides of their business. 
This is shown by the fact that the 12 dairy corporations obtained 
45.1 percent of their butter purchases through wholesalers and brok-
ers, while the packers received only 13.0 percent through such 
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Fig. 3. Primary channels of butter distribution . 1935. (Based on table 6.) 
agencies. As to sales, 28.4 percent of the dairy-corporation butter 
was sold through wholesalers and brokers, while only 3.2 percent 
of packer butter moved through these channels. It should be pointed 
out, however, that the 12 dairy corporations include not only the 
four largest companies (which, as we have seen, are highly import-
ant in butter and are well-integrated from factory to retailer) but 
also a number of other companies the major business of which is 
either fluid or evaporated milk. These companies would, therefore, 
probably not have had sufficient volume of butter to have developed 
the integrated purchasing or sales departments for butter which the 
largest butter-marketing corporations have been able to develop. 
Virtually all of the butter of the leading cooperative butter-
marketing agencies comes, of course, from their own member cream-
eries. Some of the fluid-milk cooperatives, however, buy butter at 
times through other sources, such as wholesalers and brokers. In 
1934-35, eight cooperative milk and milk products marketing asso-
ciations sold 33.3 percent of their butter to chain stores, 31.1 percent 
to "route customers" (including homes, large-scale users, and inde-
pendent retail stores), 13.3 percent to voluntary chains, 6.1 percent 
to other (probably large-scale) dairy-products companies, 4.0 per-
cent to meat-packers, 3.7 percent through brokers, 0.4 percent 
through wholesalers, and 8.1 percent to several other outlets. These 
cooperative agencies made only 4.1 percent of their sales through 
wholesalers and brokers. The large proportion of their sales direct 
to chains, institutions and other large-scale butter distributors (60 
percent or more), however, did much to free them of the necessity 
of providing facilities of physical distribution for performing the 
wholesaling function, since the large-scale distributors to whom they 
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sell have often taken over this function from the old-line wholesalers_ 
We have seen, however, that the largest cooperatives have taken over 
distribution to the retail stores to a considerable extent (62-e). 
In 1934-35, 12 leading wholesale butter distributors and brokers 
received 42.1 percent of their supply from local cooperative cream-
eries, 27.3 percent from other dairy products manufacturers (includ-
ing local independent creameries), 12.7 percent from (other) whole-
salers, 10.0 from (other) brokers and 1.8 percent each from cooper-
ative marketing agencies and meat packers. The remaining 4.3 per-
cent came from other sources. Of sales, 23.0 percent went to chain 
stores, 17.1 percent to independent retail stores, 13.2 percent to 
(other) dairy products wholesalers, 13.0 percent to (probably large-
scale) dairy products manufacturers (excluding packers), 10 per-
cent to (other) brokers, 5.1 percent to wholesale grocers, and meat 
packers and institutions took 4.3 and 4.4 percent, respectively. Other 
outlets accounted for the remaining 10.0 percent (62-f). Thus the 
wholesalers and brokers received the bulk of their supply (60-70 
percent) from the many unattached local creameries. Most of the 
rest (22.7 percent) came from other wholesalers and brokers, who 
in turn got most of their supplies from similar sources. As an 
ultimate source of the wholesalers' supply, therefore, 75-85 percent 
came from such local creameries. The wholesalers' chief sales outlets 
were retail grocery stores or their overhead organizations (40.1 per-
cent), other specialized wholesaling agencies (28.3 percent) and 
large-scale manufacturer-distributors (17.5 percent). 
These data illustrate the extreme complexity of actual marketing 
channels and reveal the oversimplified picture which figs. 1 and 3 
(and the Census data upon which they are based) present. These 
charts fail to distinguish between local manufacturers and large-
scale manufacturer-distributors (including chain-store organiza-
tions), as already pointed out. They therefore overlook the place 
that wholesalers and brokers play in making contact between the two 
types of manufacturers. The Census data, however, do purport to 
have national coverage, which the detailed data just presented do 
not. Furthermore, the Census data do give at two different dates 
(1930 and 1935) figures which are presumably comparable enough 
to reveal clearly the trend toward more direct marketing of butter · 
which has been increasingly important since 1918. Finally, figs. 1 
and 3 gain in simplicity, through bringing the most important chan-
nels of distribution into sharper relief, what they lose in absolute 
accuracy by omitting some of the minor inter-agency relationships. 
It is considered beyond the scope of this study to consider in 
detail the problem of butter prices. However, one cannot close a 
discussion of the marked shift to more direct marketing channels 
for butter without mentioning the important effect this has had on the 
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volume of wholesale trading on the large terminal markets. Since 
prices are established by this type of trading and are extensively 
used throughout the country as a basis of trading, Davis (72) has 
raised the question whether the volume is adequate to warrant quot-
ing wholesale prices. Open market sales of butter have been gradual-
ly declining for two chief reasons: 1. The development of direct 
selling and direct buying, which, as we hav~ seen, has reduced the 
volume of wholesale trading; 2. "the tendency toward premium 
sales and contracts of various kinds whereby buyers in central mar-
kets pay more than the quoted prices ... Such sales do not represent 
open trading . . . buyers and sellers having agreed . . . [only] that 
[the selling price] shall bear an agreed relationship to the recog-
nized market quotation" (72). As the present study has shown, the 
first factor is largely a post-war development. The second, however, 
is not, as implied in the reference quoted, a very recent develop-
ment,68 although the common and growing use of premium sales over 
a long period of years has certainly made the volume of sales on the 
open market a very small and decreasing part of the whole. Mr. 
Davis' observation concerning premium sales is, nevertheless, well 
worth quoting, because of his important position in charge of the 
market news service work of the Department of Agriculture: 
"Shippers should realize that under most conditions the paying 
of premiums is not possible if the basic price upon which settlement 
is made properly reflects actual market value. Premium sales are 
possible because quotations at present include principally open trad-
ing, and thus a large proportion of total receipts is eliminated. 
" Reporting of wholesale prices on the basis of open sales cannot 
be continued by the Bureau with any degree of satisfaction if the 
volume of wholesale trading continues to decrease. Either the pres-
ent policy of price reporting must be modified to permit publication 
of nominal prices with the element of judgment as a major consid-
eration, or some other type of transaction will need to be used as 
a basis for quoted prices. Any change along this line would neces-
sarily mean that the industry would have to adapt itself to a new 
basis." 
The important effect of more direct marketing channels, coupled 
with the practice of premium sales, on the accuracy of the present 
wholesale quotations which form the basis of butter prices through-
out the country should now clearly be seen. A study of the Chicago 
butter market69 is now in progress, with the solution of this per-
ple'cing problem as its objective. 
6SAs indicated supra, pp. 33&-36, this was considered as perplexing a problem in 
189 6 as today. 
69 By Gordon W. Sprague, of the Division of Dairy and P oultry Products Bureau 
of Ag ricultural Economics. ' 
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SUMMARY 
A study of the years 1930-37 reveals that, in spite of a continued 
increase in direct marketing of butter, they were most important as 
a period of retrenchment and consolidation of past gains_ Butter 
was probably the hardest hit of the leading dairy products, in spite 
of which, producer and distributor interests were never able to agree 
on either a marketing agreement or a production-control program 
as provided for by the Agricultural Adjustment Act. Government 
aid was, therefore, limited to considerable purchases of butter for 
relief purposes, with a slightly enhanced price as a probable result_ 
The large dairy corporations found their produce line--especially 
butter and eggs- a heavy burden during the depression and had to 
depend on ice cream, cold storage and other miscellaneous products 
for the greater part of their profits during the worst years--excellent 
testimony as to the advantages of diversification. Borden found its 
produce division so unprofitable that most of its manufacturing 
units were liquidated. Of these large corporations only National 
Dairy Products showed further expansion after 1931, acquiring some 
40 additional concerns-none of importance in butter, however. In 
1935 the four largest dairy corporations handled 39 percent of the 
nation's total value of dairy products. 
While there has been little change in the relative importance of 
the leading meat packers in recent years, Armour has been putting in-
creasing emphasis on its purchases of butter, while eliminating un-
profitable company-owned produce plants. Swift, on the other hand, 
has been increasing its number of plants, having always produced 
more of its butter volume than Armour. The packers' produce line, to:>, 
has been reported to be a "depression liability." Swift and Armour 
now rank next to National Dairy Products and Borden in volume of 
dairy products sold, although their produce business is merely a 
"sideline." 
A. and P. has in recent years sold from 12 to '9 percent of the 
country's butter to the final consumer and is undoubtedly the larg-
est butter-distributing agency in the United States. About 40 per-
cent of its volume is bought by its own direct-country-buying organ-
ization, the remainder from centralizers and packers. It still manu-
factures well under 1 percent of its butter sales. Safeway Stores has 
increased its number of owned creameries from two to six since 1930 
so that it probably produces a significant proportion of its total sales. 
The other three leading chains have shown no further integration in 
this direction, although all have continued to improve their direct-
buying facilities for butter, and all five now manufacture their own 
evaporated milk. 
The two largest cooperative sales agencies have lost considerable 
volume since 1930-Land O'Lakes, 27 percent, and Challenge, 14 
percent. Leading factors in their decline appear to be: a narrowing 
of the favorable spread between the highest-quality butter and lower 
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grades; the less distinctive appeal of "quality" as the volume of high-
quality (92-93-score) butter has steadily increased; substitution of 
company "93-score" brands by chain stores for federation butter: 
and loss of creameries because of the high overhead of cooperative 
distributing facilities and because of higher prices offered for high-
quality butter by other outlets after the cooperatives had carried 
through the costly educational campaign which made increased qual-
ity possible. In 1936 Land O'Lakes arranged for Armour to distrib-
ute part of its product, having abandoned the attempt at complete 
direct-distribution through its own sales agencies. 
By 1934 six cooperative regional sales agencies were distributing 
an estimated 20 percent of total creamery butter in the United States. 
A seventh producers' marketing organization, cooperative in prac-
tice if not completely so in technical detail, is Iowa State Brand 
Creameries, which has grown rapidly since formed in 1927 and has 
contributed much to a higher quality butter. By 1937 government 
grading at central country points- inaugurated as an arrangement 
with cooperatives but later extended to private concerns-had in-
creased until it was within a small percentage of equaling the volume 
of federal grading on the central markets. 
While large-scale operators (those over 25 million pounds' vol-
ume) have increased in number five-fold since 1918, only one com-
pany distributes as large a proportion of total production today as 
the leading company at that time. With a minimum of 18-20 com-
panies handling 25 million pounds or more for a total proportion of 
American creamery butter of 60-65 percent-the four largest organ-
izations selling about 26 percent-concentration in the butter indus-
try has app-arently increased relatively little since the War and is 
today far less than in either cheese or condensed milk. 
Between 1929 and 1935 there was a further decline in the im-
portance of the wholesaler-jobber channel from 39.6 to 35.9 percent 
of all butter. While butter moving through integrated channels to 
the retailer increased from 47.6 to 54.7 percent, there was an im-
portant shift within this group from "manufacturers' wholesale 
branches" to a "direct-to-retailer" movement. The indication here 
is that there has been a decline in the number of sales branches in 
recent years, and such has certainly been the case for the packen 
and centralizers, many of whose branch facilities have become un-
necessary with improved roads and trucks and the increasing use of 
chain-store facilities. 
Finally, in recent years the accuracy of the present butter-pricing 
mechanism has been questioned more than ever before. The devel-
opment of direct-buying and direct-selling have so reduced the vol-
ume of wholesale trading that-combined with the very old problem 
of an almost universal "premium" over the quotation-a drastic 
change in the basis of quotations or price-reporting policy will 
probably have to result if the volume of wholesale trading on the 
central markets continues to fall. 
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ECONOMIC APPRAISAL 
As we have seen, the important trends in butter marketing during 
the post-war period were the rapidly increasing total volume of 
butter available for distribution, with production on farms forming 
an ever-smaller proportion of the whole; the development of im-
proved quality in butter and of consumers' preferences therefor; the 
increasing amount of butter sold in package, as opposed to bulk, 
form; the tendency toward grading at point of production instead 
of on the terminal market; and finally, and most important, the 
trend toward an increased number of large operators and more direct 
marketing channels_ 
While the chief marketing channel for butter in 1918 included 
a wholesaler and a jobber, the pressure toward more direct market-
ing in the '20's frequently brought the consolidation of the whole-
saler and jobber into the same organization and the elimination of 
a considerable number of wholesale houses, either by merger or 
failure_ The merchandising programs of cooperative marketing asso-
ciations and large centralized companies (including packers) di-
verted part of the butter formerly sent to terminal markets direct to 
"maIler markets_ Many of these organizations established in terminal 
markets their own branches for selling direct to retailers_ Direct-
buying in the country by chain-store organizations which formerly 
depended upon terminal m"arket wholesalers for their supplies was 
another important factor. Mergers and consolidations of local con-
cerns resulted in a number of large organizations with highly devel-
oped distribution systems within which butter and other products 
passed direct to the retailer. All these forces have worked to make 
the direct marketing of butter, through integration from manufac-
turer to retailer, the dominant channel of distribution today. In 
spite of the elimination of one link in the more roundabout channel 
by combination of wholesaler and jobber, the wholesaler-jobber has 
been relegated to a position of secondary importance, handling only 
36 percent of butter saJes in 1935. In the same year about 55 per-
cent moved direct to retailer or large-scale user, and the remaining 
9 percent was integrated all the way to the ultimate household 
consumer. 
What have been the economic forces which brought about this 
very marked trend toward more direct marketing of butter? Since 
many of the economic forces leading to more direct marketing and 
increasing integration in distribution are basically the same for all 
consumers' goods-especially those forces associated with (a) large 
size and financial resources and (b) a standardized product70-it 
70Where the factor of perishabilij;y----€ither through physical deterioration or 
change of fashion-is important (e. g., soda crackers Or ladies' hats), it usually 
brings about more direct distribution; similarly, where the unit of sale is large and 
repair services important, as for such durable consumers' goods as automobiles and 
radios. H.ere. however. our purpose is merely to develop an analogy between non-
agricultural manufactured goods in general and butter, which is relatively non-
perishable, non-durable and the sale of which is in small units. Hence an exhaustive 
eODsideration of such more specialized factors in bringing about more direct distri-
bution in industry is beyond the scope of this study. 
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will be well to examine them first with regard to manufactured goods 
and then proceed to test their applicability to a more recently de-
veloped field, agricultural products, with special attention to butter. 
Direct marketing came earliest in manufactured (non-agricul-
tural) products. 71 The general trend toward large-scale production, ' 
with its resultant demand for large markets and with relatively keen 
competition in those markets, began many years ago to force manu-
facturers to exercise a more direct control over their product. As 
companies grew in size and financial power, their management 
turned more and more to market control. Increasing importance of 
product differentiation and branding brought more and more dis-
satisfaction with prevailing methods and channels of distribution as 
carried on by independent jobbers, who were often unable or un-
willing-because they handled many different products or brands, 
including, perhaps, some of their own-to promote the sale of the 
manufacturers' product in sufficient volume. As a result the function 
of demand creation was taken over by many large manufacturers. 
As chain-store organizations developed, offering very large outlets, 
direct selling became more feasible, such selling having developed 
earliest in those industries where the unit of sale was large. Direct 
selling was expected to give better control over quality of service, 
general policy and prices than could be obtained through the jobber. 
Once demand creation was taken over, only the work of physical 
distribution and some phases of risk-bearing and financing were left 
for the wholesaler. But even these were gradually encroached upon 
as manufacturers' financial resources grew large and they sought to 
relieve themselves of dependence on middlemen for financial assist-
ance, either direct or indirect, by duplicating the jobber's facilities 
through the establishment of branch houses, sales agencies and the 
like, thereby assuming responsibility for the other functions previ-
ously performed by the jobber, in the hope of either better promo-
tion and service or lower cost. 
At the end of the War the movement toward more direct market-
ing of agricultural products was just getting under way. By 1922, 
while this trend toward integration of marketing and production was 
marked in manufactured goods, Clark (60-a) observed that "the 
trend has not been so evident in agricultural marketing because the 
smaller size of the units which buy and sell makes it more difficult, 
and because the problem of demand creation, which is often a com-
pelling motive leading to the manufacturer's desire to control his 
market, is not so important with agricultural products. But with 
the recent development of cooperative marketing of farm products 
ana particularly the development of cooperative federation, the trend 
is evidenced in agriculture." 
71To the writer's knowledge the best treatment of direct marketing- with 
special application to non-agricultural products-is found in Clark, Fred E., Prin-
ciples of Marketing (1922), Chap. X ("Direct Mar keting of Manufactured Products") 
and Chap. XIV ("The Elimination of Middlemen"), pp. 168-184 and pp. 271-292, 
respecti vely (60)' 
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Not only were the marketing units small and demand creation 
rather unimportant in agriculture, but grading and standardization 
were relatively undeveloped both in the central markets and (even 
more) near the point of production, and the trend toward high-
quality farm products was hardly more than started, so that the 
burden of reinspection and reselection were of necessity performed 
by the independent wholesaler and jobber. Manufactured products, 
on the other hand, were usually standardized as to grade and quality 
by their very process of production so that standardization was not 
required during the marketing process_ 
Direct marketing of butter in 1918 was carried on chiefly by 
organizations most closely approxz'mating the large non-agricultural 
companies in size, resources and standardization_ As we have seen, 
two types of butter distributors were already using the more inte-
grated channel to an important extent iIi 1918-the meat packers and 
several large centralizers_ Both of these groups consisted of already 
large-scale units of great financial resources, which had succeeded 
in developing well-known brands through their own long-time pro-
gram of demand creation and market controL The packers were 
aided, of course, by their elaborate distributing system already pro-
vided to perform every function in the marketing of meats, the fuller 
utilization of which made desirable the production and distribution 
of butter and other produce items requiring the same assembling, 
transporting, storing, financing, standardizing and merchandising 
facilities. The centralizers early assumed an important advantage in 
their policy of scientific laboratory-control of manufacture which 
enabled a large volume of a highly standardized, even though not 
highest-quality, product_ This standardization not only facilitated 
direct marketing, but made the sales-promotion of a branded prod-
uct more successfuL The post-war period saw a continued increase 
in the absolute importance of these two types of companies and still 
a further contribution, through their growth, to the trend toward 
more direct marketing. 
The existence and further development of such extensive dis-
tributing facilities for butter during the late '20's made diversi-
fication economically desirable. The expansion of some of the butter 
centralizers and other dairy concerns into large dairy corporations 
was partly, at least, a result of the need of making fuller use of 
integrated marketing facilities by selling not only increasing volumes 
of butter but also considerable numbers of related articles_ In this 
way the relatively small units of sale were somewhat offset. 
The centralizers were now performing every important market-
ing function (including financing and even t;wrage) but transpor-
tation_ The many supplementary and complementary relationships 
among dairy and poultry products in the use of these distributive 
facilities were an important factor leading to the rise of these great 
companies. Apart from this and the promotional urge--about which 
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nothing definite can be said-the factor of increased stability and 
earning power was probably most important. 
The great post-war increase in direct marketing of butter was 
largely brought about by the development of still other organizations 
of size, financial strength and standardization comparable with those 
of the industries in which direct marketing had made early headway_ 
With the rise of the large cooperative sales federations after 1920, 
considerable numbers of small local production units were united 
into still other large-scale organizations, which were able to take 
over the functions of assembly, standardization and quality-improve-
ment, demand creation and selling, and, partly through government 
aid, financing. Once again, grading and standardization were im-
portant factors in making sales-promotion and more integrated mar-
keting possible. 
Furthermore, the greatly accelerated growth of the chain-store 
organizations in the post-war years was an important factor. Accord-
ing to Clark and Weld (61), "Most important of all the advantages 
which develop from chain organization are those which come through 
integration, i. eo, the combination of the wholesale and retail func-
tions. Through this simplification of functions certain expenses which 
are usually found in the ordinary wholesaler-to-retailer channel of 
distribution are eliminated or diminished ... The tendency of chain 
stores to buy farm products at shipping points rather than through 
jobbers or wholesalers is an important example of the combination 
of wholesale and retail functions." The chain-store organizations 
have offered a large-scale outlet which has made direct-selling far 
simpler and more economical and, at the same time, have integrated 
their direct-buying systems until they are well prepared to perform 
the functions of assembly, standardization, storage, financing and- . 
chiefly through institutional prestige and price appeal-demand 
creation_ 
The movement toward more direct marketing raises a fu:"dam~n­
tal question concerning the relative economies of specialized inde-
pendent agencies and integrated organizations. What of the less 
integrated channel including the wholesaler and the jobber? The 
wholesaler's normal function has always been the concentration of 
butter in the central market by outright purchase in car-lot quan-
tities from local creameries and its sale in smaller lots to jobbers 
in the same or smaller cities, who disperse the product to suitable 
retailers. These middlemen are ready to perform important services 
of assembly, standardization, sale, risk-bearing and financing_ 72 
They are in close personal touch with the trade where they can offer 
prompt and frequent deliveries and can watch collections and credit 
with care. 
Specialization and the division of labor led to the establishment 
72The last two by advancing money to the manufacturer and credit to the re-
tailer, and by maintainina- an extensive sales organization. 
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of these various types of middlemen, and, accordingly, such middle-
men are not ordinarily "eliminated," but other agencies are merely 
substituted to perform the same functions. As Clark (60-b) saw it, 
"The crux of the middleman problem is not whether the middleman 
shall be eliminated as a middleman, but rather whether marketing 
can best be performed by independent specialized marketing agencies 
or by integrated organizations." When integration takes place, 
specialization is not abandoned but merely coordinated by the con-
trol of a single management. "Independent agencies endeavor to 
control their activities in such a manner as to profit from their 
merchandising operations. When these activities are integrated with 
production, consumption, or, in the case of middlemen, with the 
operations of other middlemen, the integrating party endeavors to 
control the operations so as to forward its own primary activities" 
(60-a) . 
The choice between direct marketing and the use of independent 
agencies is basically a matter of cost. The cost must not be so far 
increased by the process of integration as to offset the advantages 
gained. If costs are lowered, so much the better, although insofar as 
the integrated agencies have represented a net addition to, instead 
of a substitution for, already-existing agencies, with smaller volume 
per agency as a result, the costs of marketing may have been in-
creased. While we have found evidence of a decrease in the number 
of old-line wholesale houses- through failure or merger-quantita-
tive data are not available to show what the net balance has been. 
Thus the butter wholesaler-jobber's once-customary functions of 
assembly, standardization, demand creation, financing and risk-bear-
ing all tended to be gradually taken over with the rapid spread of 
integration during the post-war period. The development and in-
crease in numbers of large-scale organizations made demand creation 
possible and desirable. The assumption of the burdens of physical 
distribution, financing and risk-bearing into their own integrated 
system followed, eliminating any further dependence upon the old-
line agencies so far as the large-scale organizations were concerned. 
Wholesalers and jobbers of butter, however, still have a signifi-
cant function to perform-though more limited than formerly-in 
the marketing process. It has already been pointed out that there 
is now, and will continue to be, a need for the highly selective ser-
vices of wholesale-jobbers in best satisfying the peculiar or highly 
discriminating tastes of relatively small groups of people who fail 
to conform at all closely to the less discriminating "average" taste 
to which the packers, centralizers and chain-stores have chiefly ap-
pealed . . Furthermore, wholesaler-jobbers will have a continued de-
mand for their old functions-including even standardization-from 
that large number of scattered unfederated local creameries through-
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out the country which still depend on the longer route for litc:il 
onl y outlet. 
It remains to be seen if the movement toward direct marketing 
has been carried further than is economically sound, all costs and 
gains considered. One large cooperative marketing organization has 
started using a private distributional agency once more for part of 
its product, and certain chain stores are reported to be turning back 
somewhat to open-market purchases of butter again, cutting down 
correspondingly the scale of their direct country-buying programs. 
The recent report of the federal trade commission gives annual rates 
of return on total investment for 10 leading dairy corporations as 
well as for 12 leading butter wholesalers for the period 1929-34 
(62-c). According to the commission's data, the dairy corporations 
had an average rate of return of 14.1 percent compared with an 
average loss of 0.4 percent for the wholesalers in the 3 years, 1929-
31. For 1932-34, however, the wholesalers were in a much better 
relative position, with a return of 11.0 percent compared with 5.12 
percent for the dairy corporations. In 1935 the wholesalers had an 
average return of 13.9 percent, while the dairy corporations (five 
companies only) received only 6.83 percent. While the business of 
the dairy corporations is by no means limited to butter, these data 
possibly indicate that the butter wholesalers-perhaps now becom-
ing reorganized on a sounder basis-are assuming a somewhat more 
favorable position relative to the direct-marketing agencies once 
again. It is possible that the next few years will show a swing of the 
pendulum back toward the wholesaler. But if so it will probably be 
toward a type of wholesaler who has better adapted the scope of his 
functions and services to the requirements of the recent developments 
in the marketing picture- not merely toward the same unchanged 
wholesaler of old. 
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APPENDIX 
APPENDIX TABLE 1. BUTTER: TOTAL PRODUCTION OF FARM AND 
FACTORY BUTTER. 
1917-36 (000 omitted)" 
Year Lbs. factory butterb Lbs. farm butterc 
1917 759,511 908,000 
18 818,175 710,000 
19 868,125 707,666 
1920 863,577 694,803 
21 1,054,938 681,803 
22 1,153,515 668,803 
23 1,242,214 655,803 
24 1,356,080 642,803 
25 1,361,526 607,877 
26 1,451,766 585,952 
27 1,496,495 564,026 
28 1,487,049 542,064 
29 l,597,<t27 518,300 
1930 1,595,231 529,320 
81 1,667,452 566,200 
32 1,694,132 




" Pirtle, T . R. Dairy Statistics. B. A. E . 1933.74. T able 66. U. S. Dept. of A ge. 
Yearbook 1937. 308. Table 421. 
b Data beginning With 1929 are based on more complete returns than those fot' 
earlier years, and allowance should, therefore, be made for this when comparing pro-
duction since 1929 with that of previous years. 
c Farm butter data of 1919, 1924 and 1929 are census figures, production of farm 
butter in intervening years being estimated. 
d Last year reported. 
APPENDIX TABLE II. AVERAGE WHOLESALE" PRICES PER POUND AND 
SPREAD BETWEEN PRICES, 93-SCORE AND 90-SCORE BUTTER, CHlCAGO, 












PRICES, NEW YORK CITY,b 1927-36. 
Price in .cents per pound 
93-score I 90-score 
Chicago Chicago 
Spread in 
cents per lb. 
Chicago 
------------ ----45.780 43.840 2.940 
46.81 44.60 2.21 
44.50 42.29 2.21 
36.03 33.71 2.32 
27.80 25.56 2.24 
20.82 19.14 1.68 
21,52 19.67 1.85 
25.49 23.80 1.69 
29.43 28.02 1.41 
32.60 31.46 1.20 











a Principally sales by first hand receivers to jobbers, chain-stores and other large 
distributors, in less than carload lots. 
b Bureau of Agr. Econ. Division of Dairy and Poultry Products. Dairy and Poul-
try Market Statistics. Annual Summaries (Mimeo.) 
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APPENDIX TABLE III. CENTRALIZERS AND LARGE DAIRY CORPORATIONS: 
NUMBER OF CREAMERIES AND VOLUME OF BUTTER DISTRIBUTED,. 1918-37. 
Year No. Lbs. No. Lbs. No. I Lbs. D yProd· 1 ~ I~a~ce__ Blue valleY __ I·~ir:.mont __ 1 ~ational l Bord>n Cream- butter Cream- butter Cream- butter Lbs.b'ter Lbs.b'ter 










1925 75,229 22' 45,537 19,795 
1926 I 16' 56,209 21,897 
1927 
I'" 
58,530 55,863 22,509 
1928 65,194 60,000 40,547 
1929 26c 95,837 82.607 
1930 36C (av.) 97,273 60,000 98,388 
1931 41c 70,000 
1932 
I 
1933 23g 30-40,000 100,000 
1934 70,000 92,323 88,663 
1935 95,109 
1936 136d I I I I 31c 
a Volume data from following sources (for page numbers see List of References): 
Beatrice: 1918- Federal Trade Commission. Milk and Milk Products. 1921. 
1919-30- Moody's Manual of Investments: Industrials. Annual. 
1935- Federal Trade Commission. Agr. Income Inquiry. Part 1. 1938. 
Fairmont: 1925-27- Moody's Manual of Investments: Industrials. Annual. 
1928-37- Urner-Barry Company. Who's Who in the Butter Industry. 
Annual. 
Blue Valley: 1918- Federal Trade Commission. Milk and Milk Products. 1921. 
1924- Urner-Barry Co. Who's Who in the Butter Industry, 1924. 
1933-Agricultural Adjustment Administration. Record of Hearings on 
Proposed Butter Marketing Agreement. Docket No. 32 :157 If. Aug. 
1933. 
National Dairy Products: 1925-30- Moody's Manual of Investments: Indus-
trials. Annual. 
1933-"Beatrice." Fortune. May, 1934. 
1934- Federal Trade Commission. Agr. Income Inquiry. 1938. 
Borden: 1934- Federal Trade Commission. Agr. Income Inquiry. 1938. 
b Moody's Manual of Investments: Industrials. 1921. 
c New York Stock Exchange. Listings. A-8795, A-8879, A-8967, A-9338, A-9473, 
A-9527, A-9593, A-9840. Data for 1929-31 are average number of creamery "units" 
(not plants, see supra, p. 339, Table 3) for each year. 
d "Beatrice." Fortune. June. 1936. 
e Author's estimate. 
'Urner-Barry Company. Who's Who in the Butter Industry. Annual. 
g Agricultural Adjustment Administration. Record of Hearings on Proposed But-
ter Marketing Agreement. Docket No. 32 :157 If. August, 1933. 
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APPENDIX TABLE IV. CHAIN STORES: NUMBER OF STORES," NUMBER OF 
CREAMERIES,· AND VOLUME OF BUTTER DISTRIBUTED, 1918-38. 
A & P Tea Co. (as of Safeway I First National Kroger i\m. St." 
___ F_ebr~ry~) 
---




Jan. 1) Jan. 1) 
.2!~ <II <II 
.;:: .... 0 .;: .;: 
<II "0 <II <II 
ID 8 ..ce, '" 8 .. E '" .. <II ci~ <II o~ <lI <II .... o~ ';'t:! . " . ... . ... .... 00 ..c- oo 00 0.8 0.8 Z~ Z<> ..<~ Z~ Ztl Z~ Ztl Zoo Z'" 
1918 
1919 3800 0 1223 
1920 4246 0 35,OOOb 1223 
1921 4544 0 75,OOOc 1223 
1922 5088 0 1125 1223 
1923 5088 0 1413 1152 
1924 9303 0 1874 1152 
1925 11421 0 2127 1214 
1926 14034 0 100,000<' 673 0 2856 1792 
1927 14811 0 840 0 1650 0 3369 1933 
1928 I 15671 1 1191 0 1717 
I} 3749 2131 
1929 15177 1 2340 2 2002 0 5260 2546 
193() 15418 1 2675 2 2549 5 5575 2644 
1931 15737 1 3264 4 2548 5 5165 2728 
1932 15670 1 203,531" 3411 4 2546 5 4884 2806 
1933 15427 1 183,000' 3306 4 2705 5 4737 2977 
1934 15131 1 3228 4 2653 5 4400 2882 
1935 15035 1 162,0001 3330 5 2623 5 43&2 2859 
1936 15000 1 149,929' 3370 6 2556 5 4250 2826 
1937 14700 1 3327 6 i 5 I 4212 2816 1938 I 13300 1 I I 2350 I 5 4108 2620 
• Moody's Manual of Investments: Industrials. Annual. 1918-25. 1930-37. 
b Great A. & P. Tea Company pamphlet. 1920 
C Unidentified Newspaper Clipping of Feb. 1923 in A. & P. file, Corporations 
Records Room, Baker Library, Harvard University. 
d N. Y. Prod. Rey. July 20, 1927. 
e American Creamery and Poultry Prod. Rev. March 22, 1933. 
f Personal' correspondence with R. E. Eldred, A. & P. Butter Warehouse, Chicago. 
g American Stores.. 
APPENDIX TABLE V. FARMERS' COOPERATIVE SALES AGENCIES: VOLUME 
OF BUTTER DISTRIBUTED, 1918-37 (000 OMITTED).c 
Year 1/ Land O'Lakes" Challenge" I Iowa State Brandb 
(Year ending May 31) 






24 32,842 15266 
25 79,107 18726 
26 79,567 25717 
27 84,257 28896 
28 86,649 28222 
29 93,115 30429 
1930 100,993 33866 
31 98,215 36103 
32 98,138 33944 
33 98,392 32623 
34 8&,018 30409 















• Fetrow, Ward W. Cooperative Marketing of Farm Products. F. C. A. CooP. Divi-
s ion . Bul. 3. 1936. Data after 1935 brought up to date from other sources. 
b Iowa State Brand Creameries, Inc. Eleventh Annual Report. May 31. 1938. 
C Volume of other cooperatives: United Dairymen, 1&,000,000 pounds (1933); Mid-
western Producers', 24,000,000 pounds (1936); Dairy and Poultry Cooperative 26 to 
40.000,000 (author's estimate); Interstate Associated Creameries, 4,000,000 pounds 
(1933). 
APPENDIX TABLE VI. MEAT PACKERS: NUMBER OF PRODUCE HOUSES AND CREAMERIES; AND VOLUME OF BUTTER 
DISTRIBUTED.a 1918-37. 
Armour 
Year I \ 
No. ice 
No. prod. No. Lbs. butter No. prod. \ cream 
housesb I creameries sold (OO() , houses1 plants 
1918 12c 51.()16 
1925 16d 
1926 55 
1927 27d 70 . 
1929 100,000+ 




1935 119,805 I 113 1936 53 
1 
1937 II I 24d .g 21d I I 
.. Volume figures are from following sources: 
191B-Federal Trade Commission. Milk and Milk Products. 1921 
1929-Beatrice. Fortune. June 1936. Statement that Armour and 
Swift volume passed that of Beatrice (96,000,000 pounds in 
1929) during 20's. 
1933-Armour. Fortune. June, 1934. 
1935-Federal Trade Commission. Agr. Income Inquiry. 
Part 1. 193B. Cudahy and Wilson estimates based on tables 
61 and 67. 
b N. Y. Stock Exchange. Listings. A-9l85. 
c Federal Trade Commission. Report on the Meat Packing Industry. 
4 :153. Table 39. 
Swift 
I 







No. I Lbs. butter No. I 
cream- sold cream- Lb •. butter 
eries I (000) eries I sold (000) eries sold (000) 
38c 
\ 
66.621 I 3c I 16,760 I oc 21.565 41 d 76h II 118,600h I 11e I 11 (est.) 
I 
137,580 11e 25,000 (est.) 30,OOO(est.) 
13t 
I 
d Urner-Barry Company. Who's Who in the Butter Industry (Annual). 
e Cudahy Packing Company. Annual Report. 
t Standard Statistics ' Co. Standard Corporation Records. 1937. 
g Also 2 condenseries in 1930; 2 condenseries and 15-20 cheese factories 
in 1937. 
h Sup. Ct. of D. of C. In Equity No. 37623. U. S. vs. Swift and Co. et aJ. 
Petitioning Defendants' Statement. 1930. Number of creameries on 
p. 479. On p. 316: Swift handled 5.59% of u. S. butter in 1929. Since 
this calculation included farm butter (cf. supra, p. 326, note 6). it 
amounted to 118.6 million pounds. 




APPENDIX TABLE VII. GOVERNMENT PURCHASES OF BUTTER THROUGH 












I Government Purchases (000) Through I Land O'Lakes I Dairy Products I Fed. Surplus 
Creameries Marketing A ssn.d Commod Corp d 
I 11,000 I 32,O(tO 8,573 16,176 8,680 1,715 9,825 
I I 99,0008 16,8278 
11 ,<tOO 131,000 61,796 
a Beginning August, 1933. 












"Black, John D. The Dairy Industry and the AAA. p. 357. Distribution according 
to agency is approximate, being based on data in round figures as given by Black 
on pp. 354-55. 
d All data except for 1933-34 are as given by E. W. Gaumnitz, Chief of Dairy Section 
AAA. Letter to Author, October 4, 1938 . 
• The figures for D.P.M.A. do not include 10 million pounds which the Association 
bought and resold to the F.S.C.C. These 1() million pounds are included in the 
F.S.C.C. total above. 
